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

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MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING,

In response to Senate resolution of June 5, 1882, a report from the Secretary of State submitting copies of the full correspondence between that Department and the Hon. William Henry Trescot, special envoy extraordinary to the Republics of Peru, Chili, and Bolivia, and Walker Blaine, Third Assistant Secretary of State.

JUNE 14, 1882.—Read and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, in response to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, submitting copies of the full correspondence between the Department of State and the Hon. William Henry Trescot, special envoy extraordinary to the Republics of Peru, Chili, and Bolivia, and Walker Blaine, Third Assistant Secretary of State.

CHESTER A. ARTHUR.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, June 14, 1882.

To the President:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the United States of the 5th instant, requesting the President, if not in his judgment incompatible with the public interest, to transmit to the Senate copies of all correspondence, not heretofore communicated, between the Department of State and the Hon. William Henry Trescot, special envoy extraordinary to the Republics of Peru, Chili, and Bolivia, and Walker Blaine, Third Assistant Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President the full correspondence in response to that resolution.

FREDK. T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1882.

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COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR. TRESCOT.

No. 1.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

TRESCOT,
Care American Consul, Panama:

Kilpatrick died last Sunday. President directs that Walker shall act as charge d'affaires until arrival of minister. Instructions mailed yesterday to Santiago. Proceed without delay on Lackawanna. If Alaska has not arrived it may be better not to go ashore at Callao. Telegraph before sailing.

BLAINE.

(Received at Panama, December 12, 1881.)

No. 2.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

TRESCOT,
Care American Consul, Panama:

Have you received my dispatches sent Sunday.

BLAINE.

(Received at Panama, December 13, 1882.)

No. 3.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

TRESCOT,
Care American Consul, Aspinwall:

Find dispatches at Panama.

BLAINE.

(Received at Panama, December 13, 1882, by mail from Aspinwall.)

No. 4.

[Telegram.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

The telegrams sent on January 3 and January 4, 1882, by Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot have already been published. [See also Enclosures Nos. 4 and 5 in Mr. Trescot's dispatch No. 8.]

No. 5.

[Telegram.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

On the 4th of February, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen instructed Mr. Trescot by telegram, received by the latter February 6th, that the United States only proposed to give counsel and aid to Chili in any negotiations which that country might desire to make; that Chili must herself determine whether or not she would accept such aid, but that in no event would the United States take part in negotiations based upon the surrender of Tarapacá, and a further indemnity of twenty millions, as such a demand is considered exorbitant. The opportunity had arrived for Chili to show herself just and magnanimous.

No. 6.

[Telegram.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

On the 22d of February, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen instructed Mr. Trescot, by telegram received the same day, that the President had been hoping to hear further from Mr. Trescot; that the United States would assent to a liberal war indemnity, but that consent was not to be given to the cession of Tarapacá without first communicating with the Department; that should Chili persist in her demand for such cession, the creditors of Peru might possibly maintain that the revenue of Tarapacá had been already hypothecated, and that the President desired to urge moderation on the part of Chili.

No. 7.

[Telegram.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

On the 1st of March, 1882, the Secretary of State telegraphed Mr. Trescot that the President preferred that for the present himself and Mr. Blaine should remain and report the situation; that a communication of the condition of affairs had been made to Congress, and that the President desired that no opportunity should be lost to carry out his views as indicated.

No. 8.

[Telegram.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

On the 16th of March, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen telegraphed Mr. Trescot (received March 17) that his suggestion was approved and that the archives of the legation might be left in charge of the consul at Valparaiso.

No. 9.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

No. 8.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 18, 1882.

SIR: I inclose for your information a copy of a dispatch (No. 337) of the 25th October last from our minister at Buenos Ayres, and a copy of a memorandum which accompanied the same, of action taken by the Argentine Government, in the latter part of 1880 and thereafter, in the direction of a friendly mediation between the belligerent governments on the west coast of South America by states which, in consequence of their geographical position, would be able to tender the same with as little delay as possible.

I am, &c.,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

[Inclosure 1 to No. 8.]

Mr. Osborn to Mr. Blaine.

No. 337.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
BUENOS AYRES, *October* 25, 1881. (Received November 29.)

SIR: In an interview with Dr. Irigoyen, minister for foreign affairs, at his residence, on the 1st instant, he read to me from a copy of a memorandum just received from a personal friend in Peru, addressed by General Hurlbut, our minister at Lima, to Admiral Lynch, commanding the Chilian forces in Peru, and at the same time he informed me that he had, in November last, addressed a dispatch to the court of Brazil, indicating the same policy to be pursued as that foreshadowed by Hurlbut's memorandum, copies of which dispatch were sent to the Argentine representatives at Washington and London, to be laid before those two governments.

The minister now informs me that a reply has just been received from Lord Granville, approving of the suggestions made or policy indicated, and, as the Argentine representative did not leave a copy with the Hon. Secretary of State, he has furnished me with a memorandum referring to the matter, and also with an official translation of the same, which I have the honor to inclose herewith.

I have, &c.,

THOS. O. OSBORN.

[Translation.]

MEMORANDUM.

A dispatch was sent by this department under date of November 9, 1880, to the Argentine minister to Brazil signifying to him that after the unexpected outcome of the noble mediation offered to the belligerents of the Pacific by the United States Government, it deemed it expedient to renew a friendly mediation to be carried out by such states as should, on account of their geographical position, be able to tender it with as little delay as possible. In accordance with these views the minister was directed to bring the matter to the knowledge of the Brazilian Government.

An indication was likewise made that, should the suggestion be met by the approval of said government, this one was of opinion that the Cabinet at Washington ought to be made acquainted with this initiatory step in case that Cabinet should be inclined to repeat the tender of good offices so nobly proffered on the former occasion.

These instructions were amplified by a dispatch under date of the 10th of the same month, in which the Argentine minister was informed that the President desired that at the conference the minister was to propose and base on the previous dispatch, he was to prudently enter into considerations on the conduct observed by the allied governments in the Paraguayan war, a war in which said governments did not think that they were, as victors, entitled to exact any cession of territory.

He was reminded at the same time that it was advisable that he, in his conversation with the Brazilian foreign secretary, should lay stress on the fact that this government

has no further interest beyond the achievement of peace; inasmuch as the upshot of the campaign will in no wise influence the solution of the boundary question.

The Argentine minister to Brazil acknowledged the receipt of these dispatches and in pursuance thereof, had an interview with the foreign secretary at which the latter manifested his desire to be made acquainted with the opinion of the Argentine Government as to the *modus operandi* and manner of making the mediation an efficient one. He added that he likewise, for his part, accepted the idea of bringing this to the knowledge of the United States Government.

Some time after, on December 14, this department communicated to the Argentine minister to Brazil that the President would view with satisfaction the acceptation by the Brazilian Government of the proposals he had made, and we counseled the suggesting to the foreign secretary the advisability of a spontaneous procedure on our part, without waiting for any indication from the interested governments. At the same time we authorized said minister to come to an agreement as to the manner of making the mediation an efficient one.

The Argentine minister confirmed the statements of his previous dispatch as regards the acceptance of the idea of mediation by the Brazilian Government, adding that he believes that the government has but little faith in the matter, on account of the advanced stage of the war. He also stated that he had had an interview with the foreign secretary, whom he asked if his government was disposed to admit the joint mediation establishing the following principles as appertaining to American international law: to mitigate the horrors of war, and not to exercise the right of conquest?

The Brazilian minister objected to make these declarations on the ground that they might prove a difficulty in the way of the mediation.

The dispatch winds up by saying that he is satisfied that the imperial government is only disposed to tender an officious mediation on the condition that it be asked for by the interested parties.

On December 18, this department forwarded to the Argentine minister to Brazil the bases on which it considered the mediation ought to be offered. They are as follows:

I.

This government is of opinion that after appointing their extraordinary representatives, these ought to offer the Chilian Government the joint mediation, and that the offer should be also made to the allies, setting forth the friendly motives that give rise to this act of sincere cordiality, and signifying their readiness to favor by every means consonant with their duty, and with the impartial policy of their governments the possibility of the belligerents being able to bring about by just and equitable settlements the end of the war that is dividing them.

If, as is probable, the joint mediation is accepted, the opportunity would have arrived for mediating ministers to enter upon their mission, encouraging a meeting of plenipotentiaries of the belligerents on board of some man-of-war of the imperial navy, or, in defect of this, on some other neutral one.

The meeting brought about, the mediating minister might open and preside over the conference, whereat they would solicit proposals for peace, and have them discussed; in this they will use every effort to bring about the result that is so vehemently desired.

They will favor by their friendly wishes every proposition that shall be conducive to the end aimed at, the re-establishment of peace. But they are on no account to abet any such as may tend to segregate territory or to lower the rights that any of the three belligerents may have as sovereign owner.

On the contrary, should any such propositions be advanced (and, as it is natural, rejected) by any of the belligerents, the mediators are bound to use their discreet and friendly efforts toward their being substituted by others that do not imply destruction of sovereign rights nor territorial annexation.

Besides this kind of proposals, they are to contribute with all the prudence the question calls for to the acceptance of such as may be submitted as conducive to bringing about peace.

The Chilian Government in its circular dispatch to foreign governments solemnly declares that it only aims at guarantees of peace for the future, and indemnification for damages and expenses incurred.

After setting forth in these words the pretensions of the Chilian Government, the mediators can base their good offices on that exposé, and their efforts are to aim at the guaranteeing of peace by suitable associations of circumstances, without at all affecting the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of the belligerents.

As regards the payment of indemnifications and the manner of efficiently carrying them out, the mediators will employ all such means as may be suggested to them by their ability, to arrive at an agreement as to said demands which cannot be the cause of a desolating war.

II.

Should the belligerent governments, or any of them, refuse to attend by means of plenipotentiaries any further conferences, the mediators will ask for such bases or propositions as might be conducive to a solution, and these they will submit to the other belligerent, and thus continue negotiations.

The ministers should follow the same preceding rules, that is to say, they will decline to be the channel for exactions of territorial cessions which would be tantamount to conquest. Should any such propositions be brought forward they are to be forthwith substituted by others calculated to bring about the lasting peace that is aimed at.

In the event of some one of the belligerents unfortunately insisting on maintaining said propositions of annexation as essential, and should refuse to substitute them, the mediators will declare that they are not able to submit them and that they prefer bringing their mission to an end.

III.

If, as is not probable, the mediation should not be admitted by some of the belligerents, the mediators will signify that their governments believe the duty fulfilled which had been imposed upon them by the reigning spirit of humanity in this century and by that of fraternity which ever characterized the relations between the states of America. That they deeply regret the obstacles they have met with and which they submit to the consideration of their governments and to that of impartial nations who will judge alike of the difficulties and of the responsibility they carry with them.

IV.

Should the belligerents definitely refuse (which would not seem to be possible) to put forward propositions that may be made use of as a basis for discussion, the mediators might for their part tender some such as the following:

Joint payment to Chili by Peru and Bolivia of the expenses of the war, the amount of which would be fixed by joint commissions.

Restoration of goods and lands taken from private individuals.

Indemnification for damages caused.

Guarantees for peace and the payment of amounts due.

Submission to the arbitration of some impartial power of all preceding questions, and of all such as may arise in connection with such treaties as may be stipulated.

On January 17, the Argentine minister communicated to this department that, according to what had been signified to him by the managing director at the foreign office, no answer had up to then been given to his dispatch of December 25, as the minister had intended to tender his resignation, but that, as the circumstances no longer existed, it would be answered as soon as possible.

On the 9th of April, the Argentine minister sent a dispatch to the Brazilian department for foreign affairs, and informed it, that this government had directed him to renew the proposition to mediate between the belligerents and that the basis previously indicated as the same that the Argentine Government again submits.

Later on, under date of July 17, the Argentine minister gave notice, that he had received a communication from the foreign secretary, in which the latter declared that, some short time before his receipt of the note of April 9, the news had come from London that the French, English, and Italian Governments, at the request of that of Peru, were about to use their good offices for the re-establishment of peace.

This was borne out by the answer given in the House of Lords to a question put to the government by Sir Charles Dilke, under secretary of state for foreign affairs.

The Brazilian foreign secretary added that a complication was rising. The mediation proposed by the Argentine Government had to be offered to the three belligerents and would be met by that of the three European powers asked for by one of the allies, as it would seem, without the assent of the other.

The imperial government was obliged to await information to throw a light on the procedure of the three powers referred to.

It now knows that they have already given instructions to their diplomatic agents in the west coast, and that they would recognize the authority of Garcia Calderon, as soon as ever they became convinced that the Chilian Government was in treaty with him.

In view of this state of affairs, the imperial government proposes, in answer to the suggestion of mediation of a joint nature made by the Argentine minister, a tender of good offices without indicating the conditions of peace, and this offer will be made either to Chili and Bolivia alone, if Peru had accepted European intervention, or to all of the three, in case that intervention had not been accepted.

On August 28, this department addressed the Argentine minister and manifested that this government was disposed to tend, with that of Brazil, toward the acceptance of the good offices to which the dispatch of the 15th refers.

He was authorized to agree to the form to be adopted for the opening steps, and was empowered to accept the indications contained in the dispatch of the 15th.

He is recommended to draw, as far as possible, the basis together as submitted for the good offices, previously tendered for the joint mediation, but should this not be possible, he may accept the starting-point proposed by Mr. de Souza.

In August (31st), 1881, the Argentine minister informs the department that Mr. Caballero, the Bolivian minister to Brazil, had signified to him that the Bolivian government not only accepts the offer of good offices in its own name, but in that of the dictator of Peru.

BUENOS AYRES,
Foreign Office, September 8.

A true translation from the original in this deparment.

C. A. SHOOLBRED.

OCTOBER 22, 1881.

No. 10.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

On the 18th of April, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen informed Mr. Trescot that his last telegram could not be interpreted, and requested repetition thereof.

(Received in Lima, April 29, 1882.)

No. 11.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

On the 27th of April, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen telegraphed Mr. Trescot that it was intended by the former cable of March 16 to give permission to return to himself and Mr. Blaine, and that they might return at their own convenience.

(This telegram was received in Lima on May 6, 1882.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM MR. TRESCOT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

No. 12.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Blaine.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Panama, December 12, 1881.

BLAINE, *Washington:*

The mail brings no instructions for minister to Chili and minister to Peru. Have you sent them and peace invitations?

TRESCOT.

No. 13.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. J. G. Blaine

No 1.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Panama, United States of Colombia,
December 12, 1881. (Received December 27.)

Hon. JAMES G. BLAINE, *&c., &c., &c.:*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you of our arrival at this place. Leaving Aspinwall yesterday by special train, we reached Panama in the afternoon, and went at once on board of the Lackawanna, which will be ready to go to sea to-morrow morning.

It is scarcely necessary, but it only seems proper to say that we were received by Captain Wilson with cordiality, and every possible preparation has been made for our comfort.

There is of course no information of interest in connection with the objects of the mission to communicate from this point. The rumors of occurrences in Peru are almost as vague and contradictory here as at home, and all that we have heard goes to show a continued condition of uncertainty as to whether there is any government in Peru.

I inclose the latest issue of the Daily Star and Herald, containing the proclamation of what would seem to be a sort of provincial dictatorship by General Carcers, and both in Spanish and in English a communication by Mr. Hurlbut to the notables of Lima, whoever they may be. All accounts seem to agree that Pierola has abandoned his claims to executive power, and the last report is that he has left the country.

I beg to call to your attention that the mail contained no communication either to General Hurlbut, General Kilpatrick, or Mr. Adams, instructing them as to the purpose or authority of the special mission. For reasons which are obvious I do not desire to submit to them my own instructions, and there may be some embarrassment should they, in the absence of instructions, decline to recognize the transfer of the negotiations to the special mission.

I know that such instructions were prepared, and I am confident that they were signed and ready for transmission. If they have been intentionally withheld I feel very sure that I would have been so informed, and I hope that you will agree in the conclusion to which I have come, that it is my duty to act as if they had been sent, and, if necessary, to furnish these gentlemen with copies of such portions of my own instructions as specify the duties and the extent of the authority confided to me.

Referring also to your verbal instructions, that I should take charge of the invitations to the Governments of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia to be represented at the proposed congress in Washington, and deliver them to the respective governments at such time as the circumstances of the anticipated negotiation seemed to render most opportune, I beg to inform you that the mail contains no such communications, and it will occur to you without suggestion from me that if at some later date these invitations are transmitted to the ministers at Lima, Santiago, and La Paz they should be instructed not to present them without my knowledge and approval.

Their delivery might, under circumstances by no means improbable, cause very serious embarrassment in the conduct of the special mission with which I have been charged. A reference to my instructions will, I think, sufficiently explain my meaning.

I consider this so important that I have deemed it proper to telegraph you the fact that these instructions have not been sent, in order that by the next mail I may know whether they have been intentionally kept back, or that, in case of accidental omission, they may be supplied.

I have the honor, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 14.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Blaine.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Panama, December 13, 1881.

BLAINE, *Washington:*

Telegrams received. Leave to-day. Callao eight days.

TRESCOT.

No. 15.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 2.] SPECIAL MISSION, UNITED STATES,
January 13, 1882. (Received Feb. 14, 1882.)

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I reached this capital on Saturday, 7th January. On Monday I informed Señor Balmaceda, the secretary for foreign affairs, of my arrival, and was received in public audience by the President at 1 o'clock.

I inclose the brief speech which I made on presenting my credentials, and the reply of his excellency the President. They will satisfy you that you need feel no apprehension of any such issue as you suggested in your telegram, which was received by me the day of my arrival at Valparaiso.

As the mail closes at 6 o'clock, I am compelled to be very brief, when the condition of affairs really requires a very full explanation.

Postponing to next mail a careful appreciation of the very delicate and difficult character of the question with which it has been made my duty to deal, I can only say now that I found here a state of feeling excited far beyond anything that I had anticipated. The popular impression was that I was the bearer of a positive and imperious demand from the United States that Chili should make an immediate peace upon such terms as my government deemed just and proper. And while the Government of Chili did not share in this exaggerated apprehension, there evidently existed in official circles an uneasy uncertainty as to the purpose of the special mission.

I have reason to believe that the remarks which I made at the reception this morning have relieved all apprehension of this sort.

I am afraid that it will be more difficult to correct the extravagant hope which exists in Peru of a prompt, and even forcible, intervention of the United States to secure a peace without cession of Peruvian territory.

The opinion which I think I am justified in forming even at so early a period is that Chili really desires peace on what is believed to be fair and necessary conditions, and that the government would gladly find a solution which would relieve it from a prolonged occupation of Peru. But how far I will be able to suggest a method which will conciliate rival interests and susceptibilities I cannot now say. Chili needs peace, but the destruction of the Calderon government and the arrest of Calderon himself have so disorganized Peru that there is no government with which Chili can treat.

I am satisfied that the more friendly are our relations with Chili the greater will be our opportunity and ability to serve Peru. And I can very well conceive that the present perplexed condition of the relations between the two countries may render the friendly intervention of the United States desirable to both.

After my reception this morning, I told Señor Balmaceda, the secretary for foreign affairs, that if he would accept a suggestion I would propose that, before opening any formal diplomatic correspondence, we should meet informally and have a full and amicable conversation. As I had reason to anticipate, he accepted the suggestion cordially, and I am to meet him at his department on Monday at 12 o'clock.

I inclose also a correspondence between Señor Balmaceda and myself, which will explain itself.

The matter was perhaps not very important, but under existing circumstances there might have been an intention which it was my duty to notice, and I trust that my action will meet your approval.

I ought, perhaps, to add that my reception here, both public and private, has been courteous and cordial.

As the administration removes from this place for the summer to Valparaiso and the adjoining watering-place of Viña del Mar, I will, of course, be obliged to transfer my residence there when they move, which they will probably do some time next week. I have inferred from the telegram received at Panama, informing me of Mr. Blaine's appointment as chargé d'affaires at Santiago, that it was not the intention of the department to modify its original instructions, and that I would be still authorized, in case of necessity, to charge him with instructions to Lima or La Paz.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 1 in No. 2.]

Address of Mr. Trescot to the President of Chili.

Mr. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present you my credentials as special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the President of the United States.

The frank and friendly communication with which I am charged will find, I am sure, a ready response at your hands. If recent occurrences have seemed to disturb that loyal confidence which has hitherto marked the relations of the two Governments, the President is persuaded that they are due to some unfortunate misunderstanding which need only be clearly stated in order to be satisfactorily corrected. The Government of Chili will not fail to appreciate the natural and deep interest which is felt by the United States in the prompt and honorable termination of a war between kindred republics; and I trust that your excellency will also feel assured that in no effort which the Government of the United States may desire to make towards so happy a consummation could there exist an intention to suggest any solution which would compromise the honor, endanger the true interest, or wound the susceptibilities of either of the belligerents.

I venture to hope that when I am permitted to lay before your excellency the views of the President you will find only an earnest desire for the arrival of that time when the powers now at war will resume their peaceful and prosperous progress; when strengthening themselves they will strengthen each other for the preservation of that system of free, strong, and independent republics which, founded in the traditions of the past, is the glory of the present and the security of the future in both Americas.

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 2.—Translation.]

Reply of the President of Chili to Mr. Trescot.

Mr. MINISTER: I receive the credentials which you place in my hands with satisfaction, which accredit you as the special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States.

You may be assured that in the Chilian Government you will find a sincere and friendly welcome, which will be a merited reply to the loyalty of purpose and sentiments with which personally, and in obedience to your instructions, you come animated.

I am fully confident that our friendly relations with the United States, cultivated by both sides with the constant attention that is becoming to two honorable governments, will be maintained unchanged.

I esteem as a special proof of the sympathy of the Government of the United States, the natural interest that it manifests for the termination of a war which, unprovoked by Chili, has been brought to a final end by means of vigorous measures, and it is pleasing to me to hear from you that any effort made by the President of the United States for such a purpose, would never involve an intention to suggest any solution that might compromise or endanger the interests, the honor, or the susceptibilities of the belligerents.

Chili, an industrious people, that owes its welfare and its progress to peace, and which, beneath its shade, has secured and developed the democratic principles that constitute the immovable basis of the republic, and assure it in the future, could not accept, after the war, a peace that did not comport with its honor or fully secure its rights.

I do not doubt but that your mission will fully correspond with the elevated views of the President of the United States. It is also to be expected, on account of your abilities, as well as of your honorable antecedents. You will meet from this government every facility desirable, and I do not doubt but that you will find a cordial and pleasant welcome from Chilian society.

[Inclosure No. 3 in No. 2.]

Mr. Trescot to Señor Balmaceda.

GRAN HOTEL YUGLES,
Santiago de Chili, January 12, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 11th instant, informing me that his excellency the President of the Republic of Chili has been pleased to appoint Friday, 13th of the present month, at one o'clock p. m., as the time of my public audience for the purpose of presenting the letters of credence of which I am the bearer.

While thanking your excellency for this communication, I beg that you will allow me to call your attention to an error in my official address, which I am satisfied is only a clerical oversight, but which my government would, I am sure, expect me to have corrected.

I am styled both in the superscription of the official envelope and in the address of the note itself, "Enviado Extraordinarie Especial y Ministro Plenipotentiario de los Estados de Norte America."

The style and title of the United States are "The United States of America."

Your excellency's familiarity with diplomatic usage will, I am sure, lead you to appreciate the propriety of the correction which I have the honor to ask.

Renewing the assurance of my highest consideration,

I am your excellency's obedient servant,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 4 in No. 2.]

Reply of Señor Balmaceda to Mr. Trescot.

REPUBLIC OF CHILI,
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COLONIZATION,
Santiago, January 12, 1882.

SIR: I have just received a note which your excellency did me the honor to address me of this date, for the purpose of asking me to change the address on communications that may be sent to you, by placing "The United States of America" in place of the United States of North America.

The official address which your excellency has seen on the dispatches which I have had the pleasure of sending to you is the same as has always been used by this office in its communications to the legation of the United States. However, I hasten to make a note of your remarks, which shall be attended to in future.

I take advantage of this occasion to reiterate to your excellency the expression of my sentiments of high consideration, with which I remain your excellency's attentive and true servant,

BALMACEDA.

No. 16.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Santiago, January 23, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

After several confidential interviews, Chilian minister for foreign affairs disclaims offending by the removal of Calderon. Will accept good offices, and will facilitate conference between the provisional government of Peru and myself, with the exception of Calderon. Peace on the following conditions: Absolute cession of Tarapacá; and further, an indemnity of twenty millions, payable in ten years; to occupy Arica positively ten years; the indemnity unpaid, cession to Chili; appropriation of guano at Lobos; Peru refusing no further interference by the Government of the United States.

To offer good offices on the conditions named not according to instructions.

I have to suggest, send instructions. Do not interfere on the conditions named. You may recognize the necessity of ceding Tarapacá; if that modification cannot be obtained, carry out your instruction numbered two.

TRESCOT.

No. 17.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Santiago, January 25, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Chilian minister for foreign affairs desires Kilpatrick's dispatches and instructions should not be published. Our next mail explains.

TRESCOT.

No. 18.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 5.]

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, January 27, 1882. (Rec'd March 7, 1882.)

SIR: In my last dispatch I informed you that the time for a confidential conference with the Chilian secretary for foreign affairs had been appointed. Since then I have had three conferences with Mr. Balmaceda, in which, with entire frankness, we reviewed the existing condition of our relations in reference to a possible settlement of the terms of peace between Chili and Peru and Bolivia. The result of these conferences I telegraphed you on Monday last, January 23, and I did so not only because instructions were necessary, but because the secretary distinctly informed me that certain contemplated military movements in Peru were suspended, in hopes that through the good offices of the United States some practical solution might be found. I could scarcely expect such a suspension to be prolonged through the two months (and perhaps more) which would be occupied in the transmission of my dispatch and the receipt of a reply. And I think it is evident that not only the interests of the belligerents but the position of the United States require a prompt decision as to the extent to which the government will further intervene in this matter.

I think the conditions imposed by Chili are hard. I am not at all sure that any representation by the United States will induce Peru to accept them. Chili not only desires, but needs peace. The occupation of Peru is a very heavy drain upon her population, and although its immediate expenses have so far been borne by Peru, the resources of Peru cannot long stand such an imposition, and the cost of the continued occupation and the further military operations which must be undertaken will then have to be defrayed by Chili. Peru may prefer to wait until these embarrassments develop rather than to cede territory at present, but I ought not to conceal from you my conviction, which at present I can only state to you as a conclusion without the reasons, that Peru is powerless to help herself. There is no government and very little prospect of the establishment of a stable one, and her power of military resistance to the Chilian forces anywhere seems absolutely null.

Without the intervention of the United States Chili can, and will, compel Peru to accept any terms she may choose to impose, or she will define her military occupation to suit her plans of annexation and leave the rest of Peru to anarchy.

It is possible that the terms of peace, which I sent you by telegram, may be modified at the earnest remonstrance of the United States. I have very little doubt, not only from what I learn here, but from recent dispatches from Mr. Adams, that Bolivia is willing to make peace at the cost of her littoral on the Pacific. This, with the cession of Tarapacá, is ample indemnity and security for Chili. The imposition of twenty millions more upon Peru as indemnity and the prolonged occupation of Arica seem to me to be very extreme conditions.

But the cession of Tarapacá is unavoidable, unless the United States means to intervene forcibly, and in the present condition of Peru such an intervention would have to be undertaken by the United States, with no assistance from Peru herself which would be worth considering.

It is under these circumstances that I suggested that I should be

allowed to recognize the necessity of that cession and offer the good offices of the United States if the other terms were modified. It is unquestionably important to Chili to obtain a peace, and the good offices of the United States will relieve the embarrassment in the way created by the arrest of Calderon and the disorganized condition of the Peruvian Government. The government of Montero or anybody else which would make peace, through the United States, would be recognized.

But it is difficult so say how far the recommendation of the United States would now be received by any government in Peru. The action of Mr. Hurlbut, whether intentional or not, has so exaggerated the belief in the Peruvian mind of the certainty and efficacy of the intervention of the United States to prevent any cession of territory that I am not prepared to say that any Peruvian Government will be willing or strong enough to accept such terms, and Chili naturally expects that if she accepts our good offices we will, upon failure of a satisfactory result, refrain from any further interference.

In all this I have assumed that the government has not yet considered the possibility of a forcible intervention on behalf of Peru, and in my telegram I intended to convey the idea that, in my opinion, some modification of the terms may yet be reached which would allow the United States to recommend their adoption to Peru.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 19.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 6.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,

Viña del Mar, Chili, January 27, 1882. (Received March 7, 1882.)

SIR: On Thursday, January 26, 1882, I sent you a telegram requesting that neither any of General Kilpatrick's dispatches nor my instructions be published.

The reasons for the telegram are these:

In the first interview with Mr. Balmaceda, I called his attention to certain dispatches from Mr. Christiancy, Mr. Osborn, and General Kilpatrick, informing their government of the wish and purpose of the Chilian Government to establish and strengthen the Calderon government in Peru.

General Kilpatrick's dispatches went further, and assured the department that both the late and present Chilian Government were prepared to conform to the wishes of the United States, give the Calderon government a cordial support, and make no demand for cession of territory until full opportunity had been given to Peru to pay an adequate indemnity.

The secretary appeared a good deal surprised when these dispatches were read and said that while he was unauthorized to say what had passed between General Kilpatrick and the late government, he could certainly say that no communination on the subject had ever taken place between himself and General Kilpatrick.

Some days after he called on me, and said that he would like to address me a confidential note in reference to Kilpatrick's despatches, but as the General had detailed private conversations with very prominent and distinguished officials, which they wished to contradict, he did

not desire that his letter should be published, and this would be obligatory upon him if these dispatches of General Kilpatrick were published in the United States. I thought his suggestion judicious, for the reason that I had had the opportunity of learning somewhat of the conference to which General Kilpatrick refers. In his dispatch he alluded to a gentleman of great consideration, a member of the Chilian Congress, a very distinguished lawyer, who had held cabinet position, and who has been remarkable for the moderation of his views in regard to the settlement of the terms of peace. He attributes to this gentleman a large part in the conference and its results. The gentleman to whom I refer assured me that so far as he was present or informed, General Kilpatrick's statements were calculated to give an entirely erroneous impression of what had occurred, and the detail which he gave me satisfied me that the officials to whom General Kilpatrick referred would contradict his most positive assertions.

Mr. Balmaceda admitted that the dispatch was sufficient to justify the action of the United States, and in correcting it, he was anxious to avoid an unpleasant issue as to the correctness of the statements of one who was now dead, and whose long and painful illness was a sufficient explanation of any misconception of facts into which he may have been led.

As the papers just received contained the publication of a large portion of the correspondence with our ministers at Lima and Santiago, and as further publication seemed to be expected, he expressed a wish that I would telegraph. I included my instruction in the request, as a large portion of General Kilpatrick's dispatch is incorporated in it. Of course, the secretary did not ask that my instructions should not be published, as he has not seen them, and did not know what they contained. But to make the two requests separately would have increased considerably and unnecessarily the cost of the telegram.

In this connection, while I do not doubt that a controlling necessity of which I am not informed, required in the discretion of the Department the recent publication of much of its correspondence with the United States ministers at Lima and Santiago, I ought to say that the publication has not helped me.

The dispatches have all been republished here, with the editorial comments of the home papers, and the impression has been unfortunately made that the administration had some policy which had excited strong popular opposition, and that the government found itself compelled to explain away what was deemed objectionable. The inference drawn from this is that I am not empowered to take anything like strong or positive action in reference to the settlement of the terms of peace. I need not add that some uncertainty on the part of the Chilian Government, as to the extent to which the United States were prepared to go, until in the natural development of the negotiation it was officially informed, would not have been without its influence in recommending a reasonable modification of the terms.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 20.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 7.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, January 27, 1882. (Received March 7, 1882.)

SIR: I ask to call your attention to a circumstance which may create some embarrassment in the negotiation here.

When I was about leaving Washington the Secretary of State informed me verbally that the President had decided to invite a congress of the North and South American powers to meet at Washington, and (as I understood) that the invitations to the Governments of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia would be placed in my hands to be delivered under such circumstances as would not interfere with the progress of the present negotiation.

These invitations have been sent but to the respective ministers accredited to these governments. I think you will appreciate the impossibility of tendering such an invitation to Chili until the result of the negotiation has ascertained our friendly relation. It would be exceedingly unfortunate if either Mr. Hurlbut or Mr. Adams should deem it incumbent upon them to extend this invitation to Peru and Bolivia, while it was not extended to Chili. I have written to both of these gentlemen, asking that they would take no action until after consultation with me. While I hope that they will recognize the propriety of this request, I cannot be sure that they will regard this invitation as belonging to the duties attached to the special mission, and they may, perhaps, regard its communication as belonging to the ordinary duties of the resident legation, with which I am not authorized to interfere.

I have not deemed it judicious to make any reference to it here, for I am apprehensive that the Chilian Government might construe it into a threat of an appeal against its proceedings, especially if I am finally compelled to carry out instruction No. 2.

I have as yet no reason to suppose that the Chilian Government is informed of the invitation, but as it has already been communicated to some of the governments, it cannot be long before it is generally known. If the instructions which I receive in reply to the telegram enable me to negotiate a modification of the terms of peace which can be recommended to Peru, I shall have no hesitation in communicating to the Government of Chili the purpose of the United States.

But if, unfortunately, that should not happen, and the United States should be compelled to withdraw its offer of good offices, it will be equally difficult to communicate the invitation or to withhold it.

In the first case the expression of our grave disapprobation of the refusal of moderate terms of peace may irritate the Chilian Government to a point that may lead to its refusal, putting aside the apparent inconsistency on our part of the two proceedings. While in the latter case the omission of Chili will be so marked as almost to necessitate the withdrawal of the Chilian minister from Washington and the consequent interruption of our friendly relations.

I cannot expect to receive instructions on this subject in time to be relieved from the responsibility which the circumstances may impose upon me, but I trust the Department will appreciate the difficulty in which such a contingency may involve me.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 21.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Santiago, February 2, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Have no reply from you answering my telegram of twenty-third. Very desirable.

TRESCOT.

No. 22.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 8.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, February 3, 1882. (Rec'd March 7, 1882.)

SIR: Referring to my dispatch, numbered seven, I have to inform you that after mailing it I received a letter from Mr. Hurlbut, saying that he had already extended the invitation of the President to the Government of Peru to attend the proposed congress in Washington.

This action, of which I had been so apprehensive, rendered it necessary that the invitation should also be extended to Chili, for I had no doubt that the fact would be published in the Lima papers. And by the last mail from Lima, I find that not only the fact but the invitation in full has been published.

I therefore wrote to Mr. Adams, at La Paz, and to Mr. Blaine, who is *chargé de affaires* here, to say that I desired them to consider my request for delay in the presentation of the invitation as now withdrawn. These letters, with one to Mr. Hurlbut in reply to his information, will be found in inclosures numbered 1, 2, and 3.

As an interview with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been appointed for Tuesday last (January 31), Mr. Blaine accompanied me, in order to read the invitation in conformity with his instructions.

Our interview had been arranged for the purpose of comparing our respective drafts of a protocol summarizing the substance of our former confidential conferences, a proceeding to which the Secretary seemed to attach considerable importance. After reading over Mr. Balmaceda's draft in Spanish, and receiving a copy for more careful consideration, I explained to him the purpose of Mr. Blaine's visit. To my great surprise, he expressed the wish that Mr. Blaine would not read the communication, and then, turning to me, he said, "It is useless. Your government has withdrawn the invitation." Seeing, I suppose, an expression of astonishment, which I did not pretend to conceal, he added, "Your own instructions have been changed. Your instructions from Mr. Blaine have been published, and others are on their way to you modifying your original instructions in very important particulars. The whole question about Calderon is out of the way, and you are told to be entirely neutral."

I replied, "I do not understand that there is any such thing as a Calderon question between us," and then said, "Do you mean, Mr. Secretary, that both my original instructions and the instructions from the present administration are published?"

He said, "Yes, before you have received them I have a telegram; not in cipher, but open," to which I replied that I supposed so, because I could not see the use of a cipher dispatch in referring to papers already published.

He added, "Yes, they have been published, and will be soon published here in La Patria" (a newspaper). He then went out of the room and returned with a telegram which, he said, had come from Paris only two days before, and of which he read me the first line, which, as I recollect, was, "The Blaine-Trescot instruction has been published," and then paused, smiling and looking over the telegram, as if he were uncertain whether he should communicate the rest. I said, "As you say that all this is confidential, don't make a half confidence of it. If I am to receive my instructions through you let me know them in full." He smiled, shook his head, and folded up the telegram, saying, "This, however, will not interrupt our negotiation," and then proceeded, at some length, to state why and to explain what he considered the advantages of the condition of things under the new instructions.

I said to him, "That may all be so, Mr. Secretary, but I think that a diplomatist of ordinary experience would conclude, when he learns that his instructions have been communicated to the government with which he is negotiating, before he receives them himself, that it is time for him to be silent until he does receive them. I think there must be some mistake about all this, but at any rate I must decline to say a word more until I learn from my government what it has done and what it means me to do."

He said that he hoped that I would receive my instructions very soon; that the position was strained and could not be maintained for an indefinite time, that is, Chili could not wait much longer for the United States to decide what action it would take, and then, for the first time in our conferences, his manner became excited and his language somewhat too demonstrative. "Since you have been here," he added, "two occurrences have taken place which I am sure are disagreeable to you as they are to Chili. Mr. Hurlbut has refused to consent to the export of certain goods from the blockaded port of Mollendo, unless we will consent to the import of coal, an article contraband of war, for the use of the railroad, and although we have a right to disregard his refusal, we have not done so. And secondly, Mr. Adams, in Bolivia, has addressed a letter to the government at La Paz, advising them of your mission, and endeavoring to induce them not to make a separate peace before Peru has effected some arrangement, and I do not know how long Chili can bear such interference."

I said, "Mr. Secretary, the facts which you state are grave, so grave that even in the most confidential conversation, I will not express an opinion, unless you communicate them to me officially; then I will meet the questions you raise."

He said, "I have no intention of doing so; I did not even intend to draw a confidential answer from you."

There the interview ended.

The facts of Mr. Hurlbut's action, as I have heard them, are these: At the blockaded port of Mollendo, on the Peruvian coast, there has been a large accumulation of produce waiting for exportation. An application was made by Mr. Adams, without consultation with Mr. Hurl-

but to the Chilian authorities in Lima for license to certain mercantile firms, German, I believe, to take out their goods. Fearing that such permission might be considered as an abandonment of the blockade, the Chilian authorities asked the consent of the diplomatic corps in Lima to the issue of the license. Mr. Hurlbut replied that the only American interest in Mollendo was the railroad from Mollendo to Puno, and if that corporation were allowed to import the coal and supplies necessary for its wants he would consent.

You will observe that these facts, if correct, furnish ground for a very different estimate of Mr. Hurlbut's action than that made by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. But as I had no official information, either from Mr. Hurlbut or from the Chilian Government, I deemed it injudicious to enter upon any confidential discussion of the subject.

As to Mr. Adams there has been a general impression here that Bolivia had consented or would consent to a separate peace with Chili, by which, in exchange for her littoral territory upon the Pacific, she would be indemnified by some cession of Peruvian territory. When Mr. Adams returned to La Paz he communicated the purpose of the special mission to the government, and did, I believe, succeed in inducing them to suspend any such action until it could be ascertained if the good offices of the United States could effect a general and satisfactory solution. In this I conceive that Mr. Adams was only acting in the line of his duty, but I did not deem it proper to discuss it in a confidential or informal way, for reasons which I think will be obvious to you.

Having thus given you a concise account of the interview, you will allow me to express the hope that my conduct will be approved. My original instructions were in the alternative, and if I failed to obtain such a settlement as the President deemed he had a right to expect, I was directed to take certain action, which could not have been agreeable to the Chilian Government. I could not suppose that such an instruction would be made public while I was endeavoring to secure, and not without some hope of success, the amicable solution of this delicate and difficult question. Still less could I believe that if my original instructions had been seriously modified any communication of such change would have been made to the public, or even confidentially to the Chilian Government, before I could possibly have received it. I could not admit, what the Secretary's conversation clearly implied, that I did not represent the wishes or intention of my government, and that he was better instructed than myself as to the purposes of my mission.

But as his language and action were evidently based upon his confident knowledge of these supposed instructions, any further conference with him was useless until I heard from the Department.

As both the telegram, which I received upon my arrival at Valparaiso, and that of the 10th of January, which reached me only on the 31st ultimo, the translations of which are herewith inclosed, indicated the propriety of very great caution in the execution of my original instructions, and as my telegram of January 23, stating the terms upon which Chili would accept the good offices of the United States, and a reply to which was absolutely necessary for any further negotiation, had not yet been answered, I have determined to do nothing whatever until the receipt of instructions from the government.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Adams.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar Chili, January 30, 1882.

SIR: In my last communication, transmitting the dispatches which had been intercepted, I called your attention to that one in which you were instructed to convey to the Government of Bolivia the invitation from the President of the United States to that government to send representatives to the proposed Peace Congress at Washington.

In doing so, I asked you to suspend action upon this instruction until you heard further from me on the subject. In the mean time I have been informed by Mr. Hurlbut, the minister of the United States at Lima, that he received similar instructions, and has already communicated them to the Government of Peru. He does not say to whom he has communicated them, as the representative of that government.

You will understand that however inopportune I may consider this communication of Mr. Hurlbut, it renders necessary the communication of the invitation to the other powers.

You will therefore consider the request for delay which I made you, as now withdrawn.

I beg to acknowledge your communication of January the 12th, with its inclosure. I am waiting in hourly expectation of telegraphic instruction from the Department, upon the receipt of which I will write you again.

I am, &c.,

W. H. TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 8.]

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Walker Blaine.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, January 30, 1882.

SIR: The reasons which induced me to ask you to withhold for the present the invitation from the President of the United States to the Government of Chili to take part in the proposed Peace Congress at Washington are known to you.

The dispatches which I have addressed to the department upon this subject have also been communicated to you, and you are aware that a similar request was made of Mr. Hurlbut, at Lima, and Mr. Adams, at La Paz.

I have received from Mr. Hurlbut a communication under date of January 18, in which he informs me that he has already communicated this invitation to the Peruvian Government.

However inopportune I may consider this communication, it renders the delivery of the invitation to the Chilian Government at once absolutely necessary.

My request that the invitation be withheld is therefore now withdrawn.

I have written to Mr. Adams to the same effect, and inclose you copies of my communication to Mr. Hurlbut and myself.

I am, &c.,

W. H. TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 3 in No. 8.]

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Hurlbut.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, January 30, 1882.

SIR: I have to acknowledge your communication of January 18, in which you inform me that you have received and communicated to the Peruvian Government the invitation from the President of the United States to the proposed Peace Congress in Washington.

The circumstances under which I asked that you would suspend action upon this instruction until after consultation with me were these:

When I was about leaving Washington I was informed by the Secretary that such an invitation would be issued, indeed that it had already been sent to Mexico and Guatemala. I understood that the invitations to Chili, Peru, and Bolivia were to be sent through me to be delivered as the circumstances of the anticipated negotiation seemed to render opportune.

Not finding any such instruction, I telegraphed and wrote from Panama, saying in my dispatch of December 12, "I beg to inform you that the mail contains no such communication, and it will occur to you without suggestion from me that if at some later date these invitations are transmitted to the ministers at Lima, Santiago, and La Paz they should be instructed not to present them without my knowledge and approval. Their delay might, under circumstances by no means improbable, cause very serious embarrassment in the conduct of the special mission with which I have been charged. A reference to my instructions will, I think, sufficiently explain my meaning."

The difficulty which I anticipated must, I think, have occurred to you.

I could not with any fitness extend this invitation to the Chilian Government until I had ascertained what were the relations between us. If the negotiations should terminate in failure, disturbing the amicable relations between us, the invitation would be either offensive or idle; Chili might, if irritated by the position of the United States as defined in my instruction, construe it to mean an appeal to the public opinion of the American republics against her. But still more important was it that this invitation should not be communicated to Peru and Bolivia without at the same time being communicated to Chili.

My hope therefore was that Mr. Adams and yourself would wait until the time came when the invitation could be properly extended to Chili. I thought it not improbable that you would consider the instructions sent you in reference to the special mission, as sufficiently indicating that all questions bearing upon this very delicate and difficult negotiation were to be left to my discretion.

But if your instructions did not in your opinion bear this construction, I felt sure that you would, at my request, co-operate with me in such a line of conduct as, in my judgment, seemed necessary here. I can only regret therefore that my request reached you too late, and after you had carried out your instructions as you understood them.

The communication of the invitation to Peru of course now renders it absolutely necessary to extend the invitation to Chili at once, and I have so informed Mr. Blaine to whom, as the successor of General Kilpatrick, the invitation is intrusted.

I have also written to Mr. Adams that he will consider my request of delay on his part as now withdrawn.

I am, &c.,

W. H. TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 4 in No. 8.—Telegram. Received January 4, 1882.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

WASHINGTON, *January* 4, 1882.

Exert pacific influence. Avoid any issue leading to your withdrawal from Chili.

FRELINGHUYSEN.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 8. Telegram received by mail January 31, 1882.]

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Consul at Panama.

Mail following to Trescot:

President seeks to extend friendly offer, impartially to both republics. Exert pacific influence. Avoid issue leading to offense. The Calderon affair and its surroundings can be attended to here when you come home. We prefer that you do not return by Buenos Ayres.

No. 23.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 10.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,

Viña del Mar, Chili, February 3, 1882. (Received March 7.)

SIR: Referring to my dispatch No. 6, January 24, I have the honor to inclose copies of the confidential letter of Mr. Balmaceda, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and my reply thereto.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 10.—Translation.]

Señor Balmaceda to Mr. Trescot.

[Confidential.]

REPUBLIC OF CHILI, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COLONIZATION,
Viña del Mar, January 27, 1882.

SIR: In the confidential conference that we had in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, on the 16th of the present month, you made known to me the text of the official communication which Mr. Kilpatrick, the minister plenipotentiary of the United States in Chili, addressed to his government under date of August 15, last year. The moment I heard it read I observed to you that it contained serious errors and grave inaccuracies, asking you for a copy of it. You had the kindness to send it to me on the 17th day of the present month of January, with a confidential letter in which you copy for me a part of another official communication addressed by Mr. Kilpatrick to his government on the 2d of December, last year.

In the confidential conference that we had on the 19th of this month, in the same Department of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, I pointed out to you the errors of fact and inaccuracies of appreciation which the said dispatches of Mr. Kilpatrick to his government of the 15th of August and the 2d of December contained.

I think proper, considering the delicate diplomatic situation of the two governments, to put into writing the verbal declarations made to you by the undersigned in the two conferences referred to.

With regard to the communication of the 15th of August, I told you that the present President of the Republic, Mr. Santa Maria, and Mr. Joseph Francis Vergara, the minister of war and navy, on the 15th of August, 1881, and now minister of the interior, had never spoken to Mr. Kilpatrick about the war on the Pacific, nor about the instructions of Mr. Blaine, nor about the conditions of peace, nor had ever made, as it is natural to understand, a promise of any kind to Mr. Kilpatrick; that my honorable predecessor, Mr. Valderrama, and Messieurs George Huneeus and Luis Aldunate, having met together in the house of Mr. Kilpatrick, to whom he wished to make known his instructions, Mr. Huneeus confined himself to reading and translating them, without either Mr. Valderrama or Mr. Huneeus or Mr. Aldunate giving or pronouncing any opinion about them; that Mr. Kilpatrick, having spoken to Mr. Aldunate, before he was secretary of the treasury, about the advantage of Chili, bearing in mind the wishes of his government with regard to the not annexing of Tarapaca by means of a legislative act only, but rather by the natural consent of a definite treaty of peace, Mr. Aldunate stated to him that it was an idea worthy of being taken into consideration which reply Mr. Aldunate personally informed me of about the time the said conversation took place; and finally that the ideas that constitute the basis of the purposes disclosed in the instructions of Mr. Blaine had not been accepted, as is alleged, by any of the persons referred to in the dispatch of August 15, 1881.

In reference to the note of the 2d of December, 1881, I told you that Mr. Kilpatrick had spoken to me three times before my taking charge of the office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs about the instructions of Mr. Blaine, and that on the three occasions I answered Mr. Kilpatrick that I had formed no opinion about them, leaving it to the government of Mr. Pinto, or that of Mr. Santa Maria, about to be inaugurated, to pronounce an opinion about any matter of exclusive jurisdiction of public power; that after the 18th day of September, 1881, the day on which I was named secretary of foreign affairs, although I saw Mr. Kilpatrick several times, then very sick and almost always in his bed, I did not speak with him about the instructions, or the wishes of his government, but in reference to the note of October 8, 1881, which I was obliged to address to him in consequence of the publication of the memorandum of Mr. Hurlbut to Mr. Lynch. In that communication the government of Santa Maria defined its future policy in the war, and the necessary conclusions of peace; and on my part there was neither then, nor afterwards not even an insinuation that would authorize Mr. Kilpatrick to give to his government the assurances that he gave in the name of Chili in his dispatch of the 2d of December, 1881.

I added that Mr. Kilpatrick wrote to his government under the constant influence of a specially grave infirmity, and that he composed his dispatches falling into very serious and without doubt involuntary errors. No reason is seen, nor can any be imagined, that would induce him to act in an opposite manner to that which he always displayed for the maintenance of friendship and cordiality between the Governments of Chili and the United States; but I would fear to compromise that same good and cordial understanding if I did not put into writing the declarations substantially as I made them to you in the conferences of the 16th and 19th of the present month of January.

The note of the 22d of November, 1881, of Mr. Blaine to General Kilpatrick, made

public, and in which is copied a part of the dispatch of Mr. Kilpatrick to Mr. Blaine, on the date referred to, of the 15th of August, 1881, especially obliges me to proceed in this manner.

With expressions of the highest consideration, &c.

J. M. BALMACEDA.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 10.]

Mr. Trescot to Señor Balmaceda.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, January 30, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, marked "confidential."

I found in it a fuller and more precise statement of the general remarks which you made at the conference between us, when the dispatches of General Kilpatrick were communicated to you.

When I called your attention to these dispatches I of course recognized your right to correct any misconception of the purpose or language of the government into which General Kilpatrick may have fallen, and I have now to express my satisfaction at the courteous manner in which you have pointed out what you consider to be such misconception.

Your frank recognition at the conference that the action of the United States Government was properly based upon the confidence which it naturally reposed in its diplomatic representative in Chili, and resting upon this information, was guided by due consideration of the rights, interests, and supposed wishes of Chili, relieved this incident of any unpleasant influence upon our discussions, and will, I hope, render any further reference to it unnecessary.

But you will readily understand that in receiving and transmitting to my government this communication, it is my duty to guard against any admission that General Kilpatrick was alone or altogether in error.

After many years of varied, brilliant, and honorable service he died in the discharge of his duty. How far the long and severe illness, to which you refer with such kindly and honorable sympathy, incapacitated him for the grave responsibility with which he was charged, I am unable to judge, especially when you call to my attention that between the dates of the dispatches of August 17 and December 2, there passed between you and himself the communications of October 8, in which were manifested the most cordial and complete understanding between you.

That there has been a very serious misunderstanding upon a very important subject between gentlemen alike honorable and responsible, there can be no doubt.

But owing to the death of General Kilpatrick it only remains for me to accept with entire good faith the statements you have made, and to express the conviction that if General Kilpatrick were alive to compare his recollections with yourself, and the distinguished gentlemen whom you represent, the apparent misunderstanding would be explained to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

With sentiments of the highest consideration, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 24.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 12.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, February 24, 1882. (Received April 4.)

SIR: I inclose herewith translation of the cipher dispatch received by telegraph on February 22, and the answer in cipher which I sent to-day.

I would have cabled earlier, but that I have been endeavoring from the date of your cipher instruction of February 4 to obtain some modi-

fication of the terms which I sent you in telegram of January 23, as those which Chili would accept as the basis on offer of good offices from the United States.

You may assure the President that I have urged upon the Government of Chili the wisdom of moderation in the terms which it demanded. But Chili is determined to have Arica and Tacna, as well as the territory south of the Quebrada of Camarones (Tarapacá). The indemnity of twenty millions, with this region of country as a pledge, was only an indirect mode of securing the country itself.

Peru has not, that I can see, any capacity of resistance in herself, and Chili will not yield to any merely friendly persuasion.

I ought to inform you that when, upon the receipt of your telegram of the 22d instant, I asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs for a positive answer whether his government would modify the terms of peace, he said that the government was very much embarrassed by the publication of my cipher dispatch to you of 23d January, of which he had learned by telegram. He said he considered (as I must admit he had a right to consider) that this was a confidential communication to the Government of the United States of the terms which Chili proposed to offer, and that however he might feel disposed to listen to the suggestion of modification, the publication committed his government to their proposals; that they could not now be changed without admitting that they were originally exorbitant, and had been modified under pressure from the United States.

Of the sincerity or force of the argument I shall say nothing now, as it will be my duty to furnish you with the history of this negotiation. But throughout the Secretary has assumed to be in possession of fuller and more accurate knowledge of the wishes and intentions of my government than I have received.

The communication to the Government of Chili of the resolution of the Government of the United States that it will not take part in any negotiation based upon the conditions proposed, and the reply of the Government of Chili that it is not prepared to modify these conditions, practically closes this mission. The formal reply to my communication I will receive to-morrow, but I shall not answer it until I have received an answer to my telegram of to-day. I do not feel at liberty, under recent instructions from the Department, to carry out instruction No. 2, and prefer that the President should instruct me what language I shall use under the circumstances.

I trust that these instructions will also convey my recall and direct me whether on my way home I shall stop at La Paz and Lima, in order to communicate to the Governments of Bolivia and Peru that the Government of the United States has been forced to withdraw its good offices. Under the instructions with which I was originally furnished, I would feel it to be my duty to do so.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 12.]

No. 1. Telegram from Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot, dated February 22, 1882, will be found in communication from Secretary of State. [See telegram of that date from Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot, page —.]

[Inclosure in 2 No. 12.—Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Santiago, February 24, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Chili will not modify peace terms, alleging they are, in deference to the United States, better than the offer at Arica and Lima. Terms are extreme, but Chili is so strong, Peru so weak, that mere friendly intervention will not have effect. Telegraph at once definite instructions what to say and what to do. No use remaining here. Shall I go to Peru and to Bolivia? Shall Blaine remain or return?

TRESCOT.

No. 25.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 13.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES,
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, March 4, 1882. (Received April 17.)

SIR: In dispatch No. 8, I informed you that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chili desired that the conclusions reached in our own confidential conferences should be summarized in a protocol. I therefore prepared for his consideration a draft of the three conferences. For this he then proposed to substitute a draft of his own. Upon comparison I found that while there was a general substantial agreement there was wanting in both a sufficiently full statement of the points of discussion, each of us having naturally dwelt more particularly on the views which he had himself expressed. I therefore wrote to Mr. Balmaceda a letter, inclosing draft of protocol confined simply to the points agreed upon. After mutual correction we adopted the protocol which you will find, in Inclosure No. 1.

I suggested to Mr. Balmaceda that any protocol was premature, as its whole value depended upon the acceptance of the conditions of peace which had been referred to the Government of the United States for consideration.

But he thought that it would restore the confidence of the people and Government of Chili in their old and amicable relations with the United States if it could be understood that the incident of the arrest of Señor Garcia Calderon had been satisfactorily explained; that the special mission was an act purely of friendly intervention, and that Chili was willing to accept the good offices of the United States, if the United States could find, in the terms offered by Chili, the basis of such a settlement as they could recommend to the adoption of Peru. When the terms of the protocol were finally settled I found to my surprise that Mr. Balmaceda desired it should be sealed as well as signed. I called to his attention that this instrument was not an act, but a record. It was simply an agreement that the good offices of the United States would be accepted by Chili, if offered upon certain conditions which I had no authority to accept, and which I only undertook to refer to my Government for consideration and instruction.

He said that it was always the custom in the Chilian Foreign Office to seal as well as sign protocols, and as the protocol itself provided for the reference to and decision by the Government of the United States, and had absolutely no vitality independent of the consent of the Government of the United States, I agreed to execute it as he desired.

In the conversations which preceded the protocol I had read to Mr. Balmaceda the dispatches from Mr. Christiancy, Mr. Osborn, and General Kilpatrick, in which they had informed the Government of the

United States that the Government of Chili had resolved to support the Calderon government in Peru, and in which General Kilpatrick had even gone further and assured the Government of the United States that the Government of Chili was willing to negotiate with Calderon on the basis of a war indemnity without demanding a cession of territory, except in the case Peru was unable to furnish a reasonable indemnity. While, as you have been informed by earlier dispatches, Mr. Balmaceda was of opinion that General Kilpatrick had fallen into very grave errors in his estimate and statement of the views and intentions of the Chilian Government, he frankly recognized that acting upon those dispatches from diplomatic representatives entitled to its confidence, the Government of the United States had in its relations to the Calderon government acted in the interest of peace, and with impartial regard to the rights of both belligerents. He was frank, earnest, and explicit in his disavowal of any intended offense to the United States, and claimed that Chili was only acting in the legitimate exercise of her belligerent rights. That Chili had tolerated rather than recognized the Calderon government, but that it had never rested on any substantial basis, and that its issue of paper money, the constant desertion of its soldiers to the Peruvian troops still in the field, its maintenance of resistance to the Chilian government, and its communication with the armed forces scattered over Peru from Lima, which was in the military occupation of Chili, rendered its continuance inconsistent with the existing authority or the military purpose of Chili.

I told Mr. Balmaceda that if the Calderon Government was recognized by Chili as sufficiently strong, constitutional, and representative to make a treaty of peace and cede Peruvian territory to Chili, it was a government sufficiently strong, constitutional and representative to be recognized by neutrals, and that a reasonable deference to the friendly relations of the United States would seem to have required notice of the intended action of Chili, but I could accept the disavowal as sufficient to withdraw the subject from further discussion and would transmit the explanation to the United States.

But assuming that this explanation would be satisfactory as to the special action of Chili in forbidding the exercise of any authority of the Calderon government within the lines of Chilian military occupation, and even in the arrest of Señor Garcia Calderon, who was commander-in-chief of the Peruvian forces, he could scarcely expect the Government of the United States to recognize as a belligerent right the abolition of all government in Peru by military order and a consequent anarchy which would render any peace impossible; that the neutral powers had rights, interests, and old established relations with Peru, and so long as they respected the belligerent rights of Chili, they were only exercising their own equally clear right in recognizing a government with which they could communicate, and if the United States found itself able to offer its good offices, the acceptance of the offer must imply the recognition of a government with which to deal in Peru as well as in Chili.

When we came to reduce this conclusion to an article in the protocol I found that Mr. Balmaceda was not willing to express himself with the same fullness as in our conversation. I was desirous that the form of words used should represent distinctly the ideas expressed above. I would have insisted on this form but that—

1. I was instructed by your telegram received at Valparaiso January the 4th, 1882, not to make an issue which should terminate the negotiation.

2. I was instructed by your telegram of the 10th to Panama and thence by mail, which, however, only reached me on the 31st, that "the Calderon affair and its surroundings can be attended to here when you come home."

3. When I pressed upon Mr. Balmaceda my preference of the form I had presented, he replied to me by showing me the correspondence between yourself and Mr. Martinez, in which, under date of the 7th January, you expressed the satisfaction of the Government of the United States, with the explanation he had made you on behalf of the Chilian Government. He said he considered that question as settled, and I did not feel authorized to press the matter further. I regret that I had not been informed of this correspondence, for if I had been I should not have considered it proper to reopen the discussion of a subject which had been settled by my superiors at home.

You will observe, however, that in the protocol Mr. Balmaceda confines the exercise of belligerent rights to prohibiting the authority of the Calderon government within the lines of Chilian occupation, and declares that Señor Garcia Calderon is a "prisoner of war," while he at the same time expresses the readiness of the Chilian Government to facilitate the communication of the diplomatic representative of the United States with any Peruvian authority whom he may recognize as authorized to negotiate with him.

The rest of the protocol needs no comment. My instructions had no reference to forcible intervention, and the avowed purpose of my mission was if possible to bring the belligerents to a friendly understanding, and there, could therefore, be no possible objection to saying so.

I was also expressly instructed not to offer the mediation of the United States unless it was solicited, and mediation of necessity implied the consent of both belligerents.

The terms of peace being such as Chili was willing to offer, it was her right to state them in such language and to such extent as she deemed proper.

And you will observe that the withdrawal of the United States from any further intervention is conditioned upon her approval of the terms and her willingness to recommend them to Peru. In case, as has happened, that the Government of the United States does not approve the terms, and declines to offer good offices upon such conditions, entire liberty of action is reserved.

When the proctocol had been signed, I communicated to Mr. Balmaceda the decision of the United States, which you had made known to me in the telegram of the 4th of February. When I made this communication Mr. Balmaceda desired that I would so modify the language as not to qualify the terms offered. I was willing to substitute a milder phrase for the word "exorbitant."

But this did not satisfy him. He said he thought that the offer of good offices having been accepted in a friendly spirit, and in special deference to the United States, we ought not, in withdrawing it, to censure the terms in such emphatic language.

The withdrawal itself was sufficient. You will remember that the language used was: "The Government of the United States can take no part in any negotiation based both upon the cession of Tarapacá, and a further indemnity of twenty millions."

In the meantime I received your telegram of the 22d, in which you clearly limited the language of the telegram of the 4th.

From the first it might have reasonably been inferred that you would offer your good offices in the alternative, either upon the cession of

Tarapacá or upon a liberal war indemnity, but not upon both combined. Your last telegram only authorized me to accept a liberal war indemnity as the basis of good offices.

I availed myself, therefore, of Mr. Balmaceda's objection to withdraw the letter and substitute that which follows the protocol, and which simply says that the United States cannot offer its good offices on these terms.

This letter, although dated the 14th, the same date as the original, was not really agreed upon until after the receipt of your telegram of the 22. (Inclosure No. 2.)

On the 24th Mr. Balmaceda replied that the Government of Chili was not prepared to make any modification in its terms. (Inclosure No. 3.)

This fact I immediately telegraphed you. This subject is therefore now before you upon the decision of the Government of Chili that it will not modify the terms of peace.

I deemed it proper, while informing Mr. Balmaceda confidentially of your estimate of the terms of peace, not to commit the government by any formal qualification, but to leave you entirely free, upon learning the refusal of the Chilian Government to modify them, to instruct me what answer to make.

I therefore wait to know whether I shall simply accept the refusal and withdraw the good offices, reserving to the Government entire liberty of action as to the future conduct of Chili, or whether I shall state the reason of the withdrawal, expressing to the Government of Chili the belief of the United States that such terms are exorbitant, or whether I shall take any other action such as the Government of the United States shall consider called for under the circumstances.

I have the honor, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 13.]

PROTOCOL.

At several conferences held in the Department of Foreign Relations at Santiago, on the 16th, 19th, and 20th days of January of the present year, 1882, Mr. William Henry Trescot, Special Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, and Mr. José Manuel Balmaceda, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Chili, discussed in a frank and confidential manner the relations of the United States with Chili and Peru, and of the two last-named nations with one another, exchanging their views in terms reciprocally friendly, and mutually agreed to draw up in this single protocol, the conclusions which they reached in the aforesaid conference.

First. Mr. Trescot having stated that the United States recognized the government of Garcia Calderon on account of friendship towards the contestants and in the interest of peace, and that the government of his country, being the only one which has recognized the aforesaid government by acrediting a representative near to it, might suppose that the arrest of Garcia Calderon was an act of offense to the United States; and Mr. Balmaceda having said that Chili abolished the authority of Garcia Calderon within the radius occupied by her forces, and arrested him with no purpose of offense to the United States or any other neutral power, and making use of her legitimate belligerent rights, there was no necessity for further discussion of this incident.

Second. The armed intervention of the United States in the war which Chili is carrying on with Peru would not be a diplomatic proceeding of the nature of that which is to-day exercised by Mr. Trescot, nor, in consequence would it correspond to the friendly spirit of his mission; and mediation does not conform to the convenience of the belligerents, nor is it solicited by Chili. The United States eliminates from all

discussion the possibility of armed intervention, and would offer mediation only in case that the belligerents showed a desire to obtain it, and when its acceptance would lead to results satisfactory to both belligerents.

Third. The incident of the arrest of Garcia Calderon, the armed intervention and the mediation of the United States, being points eliminated from all discussion and definitely concluded, Chili declares that, as a mark of mutual friendship and confidence, she would accept, if they should be offered, the good offices of the United States in the contest with Peru, provided that the United States, in the exercise of its good offices, accepts the conditions of peace which Chili would be disposed to concede to the enemy; and with the understanding that, if the United States should not obtain the consent of Peru to the conditions of peace, which serve as the basis of its good offices, in that case the action of the United States between the two belligerents should terminate.

Fourth. If the good offices of the United States shall be offered and accepted in the manner heretofore set forth, Chili would give, through her civil and military authorities, every possible facility to Mr. Trescot for communicating with any Peruvian authority or persons to whom he may judge fit to offer his good offices, with the exception of Garcia Calderon, who is a prisoner of war.

Fifth. The bases, in conformity to which Chili will make peace, reserving to herself every right and entire liberty of action, if they should not be accepted by Peru, are as follows:

1st. Cession to Chili of all the territory of Peru situated to the south of the Quebrada de Camarones.

2d. Occupation of the region of Tacna and Arica for ten years, Peru being obliged to pay twenty millions of pesos at the expiration of that time If at the expiration of that time, Peru should not pay to Chili the twenty millions of pesos, the territory of Tacna and Arica should remain, *ipso facto*, ceded to and incorporated in the territories of the Republic of Chili. Peru may fix in the treaty of peace a time longer than ten years, in conformity with the conditions just before stated. If Arica returns to the power of Peru, it shall remain forever unfortified.

3d. Chili shall occupy the islands of Lobos, so long as there shall be guano upon them, and both the net product of the guano, taken from them and that from the mines discovered and being worked in Tarapacá shall be equally divided between Chili and the creditors of Peru.

Finally Mr. Trescott deemed it necessary to telegraph to his government, and await a reply, in order to state whether he can offer to Chili the good offices of the United States in the manner and conditions herein stated.

In testimony of which the Special Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, and the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chili, have signed and sealed the present protocol, in duplicate, and in the Spanish and English languages, in Viña del Mar, the eleventh day of the month of February, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eigh y-two.

WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT.
J. M. BALMACEDA.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 13.]

Mr. Trescot to Señor Balmaceda.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Viña del Mar, Chili, February 14, 1882.

SIR: It having been understood between us, as noted in the protocol of the conferences, that I should transmit to the Government of the United States the conditions of peace which the Government of Chili was willing to offer to Peru, through the good offices of the United States, in order to make known to you, if the United States would tender their good offices to the belligerents upon such conditions, I have the honor to inform you that I have made the communication to my government, and am instructed to reply. The Government of the United States, while desirous to offer its impartial co-operation and its friendly aid in such negotiations as may lead to a peace satisfactory to both belligerents, cannot tender its good offices upon the conditions proposed. I am further instructed to inquire whether the Government of Chili is prepared to make any modification of these terms; and. if so, what they are.

Awaiting the honor of a reply, and with the assurances of my highest consideration,
I am, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 13.—Translation.]

Señor Balmaceda to Mr. Trescot.

REPUBLIC OF CHILI,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Viña del Mar, February 24, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note dated the 14th of this month, in which you are pleased to communicate to me that, in compliance with the agreement in the conference as testified by the protocol of the 11th instant, you have addressed a communication to your government; that Your Excellency is instructed and authorized to answer in its name; that you were desirous to offer its impartial co-operation and its friendly aid in the negotiations of peace with Peru; that it cannot tender its good offices upon the conditions proposed, and that you are instructed to inquire whether the Government of Chili will modify them, and in what terms.

In the protocol of February 11th instant, the basis was laid down in accordance to which my government would accept the good offices if, for the purpose of procuring peace on the conditions proposed, they were expontaneously offered to it. That I am now instructed that the Government of the United States does not offer its good offices, which is an answer to my government, to the question that was left pending in said protocol.

And finally I have the honor to say to you, in the name of His Excellency the President of the Republic, that we maintain the conditions of peace set forth in the document already cited, because they are demanded by absolute rigorous necessity on account of expenses, and the damages caused by the war, the security of the Republic, and its future stability.

The Government of Chili has ever had confidence in the neutrality and good friendship of the Government of the United States. This friendship and confidence is strengthened without doubt by the declarations contained in the protocol of February 11, and also by those contained in the note which I have the honor to reply to, in which, besides saying that your government will not offer its good offices, you express the desire to tender its impartial co-operation and its friendly aid in the negotiations that may lead the belligerents to the termination of the struggle.

With sentiments of the highest consideration, I have the honor to subscribe myself, your excellency's obedient servant,

JOSÉ M. BALMACEDA.

No. 26.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Santiago, March 4, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Instructions carried out scrupulously. Chili will not modify peace terms. Publication of my instructions and my confidential telegram have rendered modification impossible. Will stay as ordered, but my presence at Washington, with information, will be more useful than remaining here. What communication of the intention of the United States shall be made to Peru and to Bolivia?

TRESCOT.

No. 27.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Valparaiso, March 15, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary, Washington:

After full and friendly interview with minister for foreign affairs,

condition of affairs, in my judgment, requires my presence in Peru. If you do not disapprove, Blaine goes to Bolivia, joining me in Peru after conferring with Adams.

Reliable information from both places is very necessary.

Feel no apprehension of any departure from your instructions. Telegraph me at once.

TRESCOT.

No. 28.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 15.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,

Valparaiso, Chili, March 16, 1882. (Received April 22.)

SIR: Referring to my dispatch No. 10, in which I inclosed correspondence between Señor Balmaceda and myself, in relation to General Kilpatrick's dispatches of August 17 and December 2, I have now the honor to inclose a publication in the *Diario Oficial*, together with translation of the same.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

Abstract translated from the official newspaper of the Chilian Republic, dated Santiago Wednesday, March 8, 1882.

RECTIFICATION.

In the instructions given by Mr. Blaine to the honorable minister of the United States in Chili, Mr. Trescot, mention is made of the notes of August 15 and December 2 of last year, addressed by General Kilpatrick to his government

In the conferences that took place on the 16th, 19th, and 20th of January, the text of those notes was made known, and at the moment Señor Balmaceda objected, immediately addressing an official note to the Special Envoy of the United States, in which he made serious rectifications.

The said notes having been published in the United States, and reference having been made to them in the instructions which Mr. Blaine gave to Mr. Trescot, it is expedient to make known officially, whilst awaiting the arrival of the original documents published in the United States which will authorize the publications of the rectifications by Mr. Balmaceda in Chili, that those notes contain substantial errors.

This rectification being of as much interest for the exactness of the foreign transactions of the Government of Chili as for the cordial and correct understanding with the United States, it is proper that it should be made known that the Government of Chili has objected to the notes of August 15 and December 2 of last year from Mr. Kilpatrick to his government.

No. 29.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

VALPARAISO, *March* 21, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Telegram received. Leave twenty-first.

TRESCOT.

No. 30.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION, LIMA,
(Received in Washington, April 2, 1882.)

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Arrived twenty-eighth. General Hurlbut died suddenly of heart disease on morning of twenty-seventh.

TRESCOT.

No. 31.

No. 17] *Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.*

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Lima, Peru, March 29, 1882. (Received April 26.)

SIR: It has become my very melancholy duty to inform you of the sudden death of General Hurlbut, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in Peru.

He died very suddenly on the morning of the 27th of disease of the heart. There had been no indication of indisposition of any kind, and he got up about seven o'clock in apparently perfect health. He had partly dressed, and was just about washing his face when he fell. For thirty minutes he appeared to suffer greatly, and at the end of that time he was dead. After the first paroxysm he exclaimed, "*Angina pectoris*," and with a very few words to his family, showing that he felt he was dying, he passed away.

An autopsy was held by the fleet surgeon, a physician appointed by General Lynch, the commander of the Chilian forces, and some Peruvian members of the medical profession. I cannot send you in this dispatch the official report of the autopsy, but I can say that the opinion of the fleet surgeon and of the family are one as to the cause of his death.

The peculiar and excited condition of public opinion here has given rise to reports which are so absurd that I do not think they ought even to be repeated. Upon the announcement of his death, General Lynch issued orders that his funeral should be attended with the military ceremonies to which a major-general in the Army would be entitled. But the family declined this courtesy. The funeral was, at their desire, a private one, but General Lynch acted as chief pall-bearer, and there was a very full attendance of the officers of the Chilian Army and Navy.

It is only proper for me to add that the manifestation of public feeling was very demonstrative, and apparently very sincere. The streets through which the funeral cortege passed were thronged, and from the balconies flowers were thrown upon the hearse.

I reached Callao at sundown yesterday, and was first informed of General Hurlbut's death by signal from the flag-ship. I came here by the earliest train I could take after seeing the admiral.

I regret exceedingly that I have not the right to request that his remains should be carried to Panama in a ship of war. The privacy of

such a voyage would be grateful to his distressed family, and the honor to him would have been well deserved by one who, whatever may have been his faults of judgment, meant to serve his country faithfully and honorably. I shall take the liberty of urging upon the admiral a compliance with this wish of the family, for, besides the reasons which I have stated, General Hurlbut has died in the service of his country a poor man.

Mr. Moore, the consul at Callao, has taken charge of the archives of the legation, and, with the uncertainty of my stay here and his entire fitness, I have not felt that I was called upon to interfere.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 32.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

(Confidential.)

No. 19.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,

Lima, Peru, April 5, 1882. (Received April 26.)

SIR: I must ask that this dispatch be considered entirely confidential. My reason for the request will, I think, be apparent and satisfactory when you have read it.

In dispatch No. 13, under date March 4, I communicated to you the protocol and the consequent correspondence between Señor Balmaceda and myself. The position then established was that the Government of the United States declined to offer its good offices upon the conditions stated in the protocol, and the Government of Chili declined to modify those conditions.

From the date of that correspondence up to the time of my leaving Valparaiso, I had several full and frank conversations with the Chilian secretary of state.

I cannot undertake to repeat these discussions in detail. It will be sufficient to say that on the Sunday before my departure (18th March) the secretary expressed to me in the strictest confidence his willingness to consider the following modifications of his original terms, if Peru would propose them as a substitute:

* * * * * * *

You will see that these are very considerable concessions. Of course I told the secretary that I had no authority to accept them as the basis of an offer of good offices; that I could not even say that as a matter of individual opinion, I would advise their acceptance, and that I did not believe they would be accepted. He thought they would be. All that I felt authorized to do was to bring them confidentially to the notice of the provisional government of Peru.

* * * * * * *

[Note to dispatch No. 19.]

The extracts from this dispatch are sufficient to render entirely intelligible the references in the dispatches which follow.

The President does not deem it proper to publish the modifications of the terms of peace suggested, as they were communicated in confidence to the diplomatic representative of the United States, and as the prospects of negotiations between Peru and Chili cannot be considered as terminated.

For the same reason the explanation of the terms in detail, and the considerations in reference to them by the minister of the United States, submitted in this dispatch, are omitted.

No. 33.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Lima, April 12, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Will leave on the 15th, being absent a few days, to see Montero. I believe bases negotiations between the belligerents can be obtained. Is most important I should be in Washington before opening of the negotiations to inform you of facts. Telegraph answer Lima.

TRESCOT.

[The errors in transmission rendered this telegram, as it reached the department, undecipherable This translation is taken from Mr. Trescot's dispatch No. 23.]

No. 34.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

SPECIAL MISSION,
Lima, May 3, 1882. (Received May 8, 1882.)

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Undecipherable telegram contained substance my dispatch No. 19. I had an interview with Montero. He is desirous of peace; preliminary to the negotiations he asks that Government of Chili recognize the provisional government, and grant armistice, allowing the meeting of Congress. Have urged compliance upon the Government of Chili. Still waiting reply. I consider it important that I should be in Washington before the negotiations are opened.

Please to reply by telegraph immediately.

TRESCOT.

No. 35.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 24.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Lima, Peru, May 3, 1882. (Received May 26.)

SIR: Referring to my dispatch, No. 19 April 5, I have to inform you that I left Lima, as telegraphed, on the 15th for Casma, the only open port on the Peruvian coast, and thence proceeded to Huaraz, the seat of

the provisional constitutional government of Peru. The journey having been safely accomplished, no reference to its incidents is necessary. But it is perhaps proper that I should call your attention to the fact that it is scarcely proper that the minister from the United States to Peru should reside within the lines of the Chilian military occupation, and if, as he ought, he goes to the seat of the provisional government he must be prepared to meet great discomfort. Huaraz is an old Indian town one hundred miles from the coast, lying between the Black Cordillera and the Cordillera Nevada, which is the line of perpetual ice. The elevation is high enough to occasion great uneasiness to persons unaccustomed to such elevation, and it can only be reached by the mountain road traveled by the pack-mules which bring to the coast the ore from the silver mines of the province.

I undertook the journey because I believed that the presentation of my letters of credence would strengthen what is unquestionably the real Government of Peru, recognized and obeyed at present by all parties of the Peruvian people. It is, of course, confined in its sphere of authority, is feeble in strength, and restricted in resources, but it is an actual government, and represents whatever Peruvian nationality still exists. You will remember that while accepting the disavowal of the Chilian Government of any intended offense in the arrest of Señor Calderon, I took the ground that such action could not destroy the existence of the Government of Peru, and I felt bound to do whatever was necessary to maintain the recognition of that government by the United States.

I was also authorized, as dispatch No. 19 has informed you, to indicate to the Peruvian Government that certain modifications in the terms of the protocol would be considered by the Chilian Government. The only government in Peru which, under my instructions, I was authorized to recognize was the provisional government; and if there was any possibility of bringing the belligerents to a negotiation for peace, the matter was too important for any but direct communication with the President of Peru himself.

I arrived in Huaraz on Saturday, the 22d April, and presented my credentials to General Montero on Tuesday, the 25th. I inclose the very brief speech which I made, and the President's reply. (Inclosures No. 1 and 2.) After several conferences with Señor Alvarez, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he addressed me the letter which you will find in inclosure No. 3.

I found General Montero and his advisers fully alive to the importance to Peru of peace, and perfectly aware that under existing circumstances peace could only be obtained at the cost of great sacrifice. But I am obliged to modify to some extent the impression which I had received in Lima, and which I communicated in dispatch No. 19. I am still of opinion that three-fourths, if not more, of the business men on the coast would make peace at the cost of the cession of Tarapaca, and I believe that the government also recognizes the necessity. But the government is not strong enough to act independently, and the papers from the United States containing Senator Call's speech and your instruction to me of the 24th February have induced a belief here that a practical intervention of the United States to save cession of Tarapaca is still possible.

There is not, in my opinion, the slightest possibility of Peru's contributing anything to such a result. She depends entirely upon the action of the United States. I cannot express too strongly my conviction that the time has come when the United States Government should say dis-

tinctly to Peru to what extent it is prepared to act practically in the way of intervention. As I wrote you, the Chilian Government is perfectly aware that if the United States determine to intervene forcibly, the opportunity must be given to Peru to pay a sufficient indemnity and save the cession of territory. But Chili does not believe that the United States will so interfere, and she will maintain her position until the demonstration of such forcible intervention is made. Peru ought not to be allowed to delude herself with such an expectation if it is not to be realized.

As I have said, General Montero recognized the necessity for peace, and while he was not prepared to accept either the terms of the protocol or the modifications indicated in dispatch No. 19, he was prepared to make an earnest and serious effort for peace upon the preliminary conditions—

1. That the Chilian Government should recognize him as the lawful executive representative of the existing provisional government of Peru. This he undoubtedly is. All parties and factions in Peru have agreed to recognize and obey his authority, and I cannot see how the Chilian Government can expect him to make peace until it is willing to recognize his authority to do so, which can only be derived from his official position as the executive of an actual government.

2. If so recognized, he is a constitutional ruler, although a provisional one, and can only act within the limits of his constitutional authority. A treaty signed by him without the consent of the National Congress would be simply worthless, and he cannot, as an honest and honorable man, pledge himself in advance to any treaty. General Montero therefore asks that the Chilian Government will grant such an armistice as will enable him to call his congress together at Arequipa, the only place where it can be conveniently called. I am so sure that you will consider these requests reasonable that I have urged their concession upon the Chilian Government, and you will find in inclosure No. 4 my letter to the Chilian Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

I addressed him this letter because I had this morning a long interview with General Lynch, the military commander, and Señor Novoa, the representative of the civil authority of Chili here. Señor Novoa, who informs me that he is authorized to conduct the negotiation for peace, was not prepared to act upon my representations, and, as he felt bound to refer the question to his government, I addressed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs directly.

What the terms of peace should be I will not now attempt to discuss. I suppose my views would not be entirely acceptable to either party. But I do think that the requests of General Montero are reasonable, and that their refusal affords a fair ground for protest on the part of the independent powers who desire to see peace restored.

My letter, however, to the Chilian Secretary for Foreign Affairs expresses my views so fully as to render their repetition here unnecessary.

If these requests are granted, I think an earnest negotiation may be expected, with some assurance of a practical result. In that case I deem it of the utmost importance that I be allowed to come home and lay before you the results of my observation here, which I can scarcely do with sufficient fullness in a dispatch. You will then be enabled, I trust, to give definite instructions to the excellent, experienced, and able ministers who have been recently appointed to supply the vacant missions in Chili and Peru.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure No. 1 in No. 24.]

SPEECH OF MR. TRESCOT TO PRESIDENT MONTERO.

Mr. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present to your excellency my credentials as Special Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the President of the United States to your Government.

I need not assure Your Excellency of the sympathy felt by the United States in the efforts made by the provisional government of Peru to establish order and to obtain peace. The prompt recognition of Señor Calderon, the continued recognition of the government, after it had been deprived of the eminent and patriotic services of that distinguished citizen, and the earnest and persistent efforts made by my government to find a basis upon which its intervention, in a spirit of equal friendship and respect for all the belligerents, could contribute to effect a secure and honorable peace are proofs sufficient.

It would be manifestly unbecoming in me to discuss the causes which have so far obstructed the success of this endeavor. But I have felt it my duty to wait upon Your Excellency, not without the hope that means may yet be found by which, with mutual and honorable concession, negotiations may be initiated, which will reconcile the interests of all the belligerents and restore the peace so much desired.

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 24.]

PRESIDENT MONTERO'S REPLY.

Mr. MINISTER: I receive with the greatest satisfaction the credentials of the Envoy of the great republic, called upon, on account of its progressive ideas and unlimited prosperity, to exercise its beneficial influence in the moral order of the continent.

The sympathy of the United States towards the provisional government has not only been demonstrated by the great proofs that you have just shown, but by visible results. Your predecessor, General Hurlbut, whose memory will be preserved in Peru with eternal gratitude on account of his opportune mission near the provisional government of Señor Garcia Calderon, and on account of having strengthened the constitutional government in our country, caused that sympathy to produce unspeakable good at the time.

My government highly esteems the recognition of it, and welcomes with the most profound esteem the mission that you have come to fulfill at this time.

The basis upon which the efforts of your government wishes to make peace, is easy to be understood in justice and in the interest of the entire continent.

It appears that some countries have considered the question of the Pacific as one of simply a private interest between three belligerent Republics. The government of Chili expressed to the neutral powers in its war circular against Peru, that it would not be reasonable to suppose that the government of Santiago would attempt to modify the geographical limits of the neighboring nations. That statement caused the war on the Pacific to be looked upon in that light; but afterwards that government changed, after having solemnly averred it, and therefore the face of the question was completely changed.

The pretensions of Chili, palpable before the war, and exposed after its victories, have transformed the apparent question of private interests among three Republics into a question of continental interest.

To-day the question is whether a State that declares war to settle disputes which are susceptible of a peaceable solution, can, as a consequence of its victories and of the sacrifices that it had no necessity to make, exact not only complete success, but the acquisition of territory and riches to which it never pretended to have a right.

The question is one of conquest; a continental and American question.

In your great nation and the others of this continent, you have to consider if by Chilian preponderance on the Pacific, by means of the appropriation of foreign territories and the boundless wealth they contain, the door would be left open for other encroachments by force of arms and for national changes in consequence of conquest.

Peru has to look forward, as likewise all America, to the influence and the results that these transformations would bring about in the relations between the old and the new continent. Finally Peru has to struggle for the triumph of principle.

Every epoch has its moral progress and some prevailing idea for the good of humanity; Chili has not been capable, with the fortune of its arms, of combating in this war for the triumph of a beneficent idea, but only for usurpation. Peru is capable, in the midst of its misfortunes, of sacrificing its present in order to contribute by determined resistance, toward securing the future of America, and will not abandon that course without disappearing as an independent nation.

The solidity of interests and the nature of the social and political basis upon which the existence of the American states depend, in their internal order and in their external relations, permit us to hope that the generous exertions of the great republic of this continent, in favor of the re-establishment of peace upon honorable and equitable conditions, have not been concluded, since reasons of justice, political morality, and legitimate influence, which initiated them with such a laudable purpose and which is sanctioned by the history and the traditional policy of your government, still exist.

Peru desires peace and is ready to make any concession that will not wound its honor, its rights, and interests, or the rights, honor, and interests of the allies.

Your noble mission will contribute, I hope, to avoid the dismemberment, and with it the destruction of the ancient nationalities of America.

The eminent qualities which adorn and make you personally so estimable are a guarantee for the happy success of these ideas.

[Inclosure No. 3 in No. 24.]

Señor Alvarez to Mr. Trescot.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR PERU,
Huaraz, April 26, 1882.

SIR: The mission which Your Excellency has come to fulfill near the Govenment of Peru is another proof of the repeated efforts of Your Excellency's government to bring about peace between the belligerent Republics on the Pacific; but up to now these efforts have only met with two impediments, which cannot be considered insuperable to a peaceful mind. The first is found in conditions which Chili proposes to impose—conditions which I need not define, with particularity since the government of Your Excellency has viewed them as inacceptable as a starting point in its good offices. The second is the resistance that Chili makes to all previous discussion. The purpose is clearly not to allow a discussion, and this determination, which is not reasonable, nor according to the usual practice of modern nations, shuts the door to every way to an arrangement.

Peru wishes peace and is ready to make for that purpose, in concert with its ally, the Republic of Bolivia, any sacrifice that will not compromise the future which both have had the right to expect since they entered the list of independent republics. But it is impossible to know, either the nature of these sacrifices or how far they may go, without a reasonable debate that would carry conviction to the mind. It is not impossible, on the other hand, that Chili itself may become persuaded of the convenience and necessity of modifying its pretension, to some acceptable terms, and it would appear incompatible with the rules of human prudence for Chili itself to place, with unnecessary persistence, obstacles in the path of its own interests.

The inconveniences that appear to have been alleged by Chili at one time against entering into conferences with Bolivia and Peru were on account of the internal dissensions of the latter; but Your Excellency is a witness that they do not exist and that there is only one government recognized without exception from one end of the country to the other; that this government is the emanation of a constitutional congress, and that all factions have yielded to its authority.

It would not be possible to explain in truth how a government recognized by the government of Your Excellency, before which Your Excellency is discharging your mission, and which is the only one in the country, should not be considered by the Government of Chili as the Government of Peru with which to discuss the points of an arrangement. The Government of Chili can do no less than abandon this idea, because by the force of things it has to come to an understanding with some political entity that may represent Peru, and this cannot be any other than the legal government recognized by all the nation.

In such a case, the provisional government being a constitutional government and being bound by a treaty to the constitutional government of Bolivia, it should proceed with its approval in all its resolutions. Therefore the road to peace might be shortened and facilitated if both governments could get together, and Peru arrange the best means of assembling congress, without whose approval any arrangement is impossible.

As Your Excellency's mission is one of peace, I deem it proper to make you the present suggestions, that tend to level the first difficulties which come in the way, and thus to show the sincere wish that my government entertains of reaching it.

With sentiments, &c.

M. ALVAREZ.

[Inclosure No. 4 in No. 24.]

Mr. Trescot to Señor Aldunate.

SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA, LIMA, PERU,
May 3, 1882.

SIR. You are aware that in my last confidential conversation with your predecessor, Señor Balmaceda, it was understood that if the opportunity offered, I was authorized to indicate to the provisional government of Pern, certain possible modifications in the terms of peace stated in the protocol.

I have presented my credentials to General Montero as Vice President of the provisional constitutional government of Peru and have had several conferences with Señor Alvarez, his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I found General Montero and his advisers fully aware of the importance of peace to Peru and not disposed to conceal from themselves or the country that at the end of an honorable, patriotic, but unsuccessful war, peace would have to be purchased at the cost of great sacrifices. He would have found himself unable to discuss the acceptance of the terms stated in the protocol. But if he was at liberty to assume that these terms were capable of modification, he would gladly, in concert with his ally, the Government of Bolivia, make every effort to reach such modification as would satisfy the just demands of Chili.

But you are aware that the President is only the executive officer of a government which is constitutional while it is provisional. A treaty signed by him, without the authority of the national congress, especially if it should provide for the cession of territory, would be simply worthless.

It would seem therefore only reasonable that before the President makes any overtures looking to peace, he should have an assurance from the Chilian Government on two points:

1. That he will be recognized by the Chilian Government as the lawful executive representative of the provisional constitutional government of Peru.

I think it cannot be denied that at the present moment the government of General Montero, however reduced his forces or restricted his resources, does represent the existing nationality of Peru, and is recognized and obeyed by the Peruvian people.

2. In order to initiate the negotiations which it is hoped may lead to a secure and honorable peace, the President would have to receive the authority of the National Congress to make the necessary concessions. Is the Government of Chili willing to agree to such an armistice as would allow the President to summon congress to meet him at Arequipa, the only place at which it could be conveniently assembled? If so, the President is prepared immediately to call congress together to lay before them the condition of the country, the necessity for peace, and the terms upon which it may probably be obtained. I venture to express the earnest hope that you will find an acceptance of these preliminary conditions consistent with the rights and interests of your government.

It is needless for me to recall to you the fact that General Montero holds his office by virtue of the authority of congress, which gave him power to make peace, but which forbade his doing so on the basis of cession of territory. It is therefore impossible for General Montero to make any promises implying territorial cession in advance. Such promises would have no official weight whatsoever; nor do I think that with due regard to his honor you could ask him to make assurances of such a nature. But I am of opinion that as all parties in Peru have recognized him as the constitutional head of the government, and as Chili has never denied the national existence of Peru, he may rightfully ask, when expressing, as he does, a sincere desire for peace, that his path may be thus far facilitated by your government, and recent instructions received from my government warrant me in expressing to you the earnest desire and hope of the United States that Chili may be able to agree to the requests made by General Montero.

At present it seems to me that the anomalous conditions of the relations between Chili and Peru are the real obstacles to a satisfactory peace. Until Chili recognizes the existence of a lawful and responsible government in Peru, there is no authority with which to deal, and a peace—if such a solution can properly be called a peace—can be reached only by the imposition by force of such terms as Chili may dictate.

Nor can I perceive that these concessions would in the slightest degree weaken the present position of the Chilian Government. The terms upon which the armistice would be granted could provide that there should be no change in the military condition, either by increase of the Peruvian forces or the acquisition of supplies, while the full responsibility of accepting or rejecting the terms of peace would be placed where they must finally rest before any peace can be made secure upon the Pernvian people.

In making these suggestions you will understand that I am acting upon my last

conversation with Señor Balmaceda, rather as a friendly mediator than in my official character as the special envoy to the belligerents. The views of General Montero, as I have expressed them, have been transmitted to my government.

I have furnished a copy of this letter to Señor Novoa, and I beg to request that, as it is most important for my government to be informed of the intentions of Chili, you will send an answer to Señor Novoa by cable as soon as possible.

I avail, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 36.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 25.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Lima, Peru, May 9, 1882. (Received June 2.)

SIR: I beg to forward herewith dispatches from Mr. Walker Blaine to myself, referring to his recent visit to Bolivia.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure to No. 25.]

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Trescot.

No. 4.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Lima, Peru, May 8, 1882.

SIR: Referring to the subject of my dispatch numbered one, and dated Arequipa, March 28, 1882, which is hereunto attached, marked inclosure No. 1, I have the honor to further report that on Wednesday, March 29, 1882, I left Arequipa for La Paz, Bolivia, arriving at the latter place at noon of Friday, March 31. In the afternoon of that day I had the pleasure of receiving visits from Señor Zilveti, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and from Señor Del Valle, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from Peru to Bolivia. These visits were purely of a personal nature, and our conversation was of the most general character.

On Saturday morning, April 1, I was, however, received officially by Señor Zilveti and, in company with the gentlemen who accompanied me to La Paz, presented to Señor Salinas, the vice-president of Bolivia, and to the ministers of the government, the President of the country, General Campero, being then with the army (consisting of some five thousand men) at Oruro. The conversation between Señor Zilveti and myself, which followed this presentation, is, with one or two noted exceptions, summarized with sufficient accuracy in the memorandum of Señor Zilveti, which was forwarded to you through Mr. Adams, of which a copy and translation are herewith inclosed (marked inclosures 2 and 3).

I had also, during the evenings of March 31 and April 1, two long interviews with Señor Del Valle, the minister from Peru to Bolivia. Our conversation was unreserved and confidential; the principal incident worthy of comment was that Señor Del Valle showed me a memorandum, signed on the 11th of February last by Señor Zilveti and himself, the effect of which is to strengthen the alliance now subsisting between Peru and Bolivia, and by which the two parties agree to act in entire harmony and concert in all negotiations and efforts for peace with Chili. This agreement was shown to me in such confidence that I beg to earnestly request that knowledge on our part of its existence may be kept secret.

Señor Del Valle further stated to me that he feared that his government would not regard with favor the proposition to exchange a portion of its littoral for an interior province of Bolivia, an arrangement which had been suggested by Señor Carrillo, in our conversation at Arequipa. (See my dispatch, inclosure No. 1.) The acquisition of such territory would, in his opinion, add nothing to the revenues of Peru; its care and government would be, in fact, only a source of expense, while the port upon the Pacific which Bolivia would obtain by the exchange is a source of large revenue to

Peru. It was, however, thought Señor Del Valle, possible for an arrangement to be made by which the effective neutrality of some selected port of Peru, for example, Arica or Mollendo, could be guaranteed to Bolivia, and all the imports and exports of that country admitted and dispatched free of duty. In expressing these opinions Señor Del Valle spoke in a personal capacity, as he had no instructions from his government, nor was he informed as to its views. In the opinions expressed by Señor Carrillo, and reaffimred by Señor Zilveti, the suggestion is made that Bolivia will cede her littoral to Chili only as in lieu of an indemnity, and that it shall be clearly expressed in the treaty of peace that acquisition of territory as the rightful result of conquest in war is not in any way recognized, but is, on the contrary, expressly disavowed. Señor Del Valle, who was informed of these views of the Government of Bolivia, stated to me that they would doubtless coincide with those of his own government, but he was unable to see how, in accordance with these ideas, Peru could justly surrender Tarapaca. Bolivia yields Atacama only because she finds herself unable to pay a war indemnity, the amount of which is to be specified in the definitive treaty, and which she admits that, as a vanquished nation, she ought to pay. But how can Peru be called upon to cede territory when she is willing and amply able to pay the most liberal indemnity to Chili? I make mention of these views merely for the purpose of pointing out a stumbling-block, which would seem to obstruct united and harmonious effort on the part of Peru and Bolivia to make peace with Chili.

Leaving La Paz on the morning of Sunday, April 2, I arrived in Arequipa on the evening of Monday the 3d. That evening Señor Carrillo, the Bolivian minister, called upon me, and again expressed his desire to proceed to Lima, requesting me to obtain from the Chilian authorities the necessary permission to do so. This, as you are aware, I did, upon returning to Lima, and on April 15 forwarded to him the passport which, at my request, Señor Novoa had obtained for him and for his secretary from Admiral Lynch, but so poor are the postal arrangements that, though Señor Carrillo did not leave Arequipa until the 4th of May, my letter containing the passport and marked upon the envelope as from the special mission of the United States never reached him.

I returned to Mollendo on Tuesday, April 4, and sailing upon the U. S. S. Alaska had the pleasure of rejoining you in Lima on Friday, the 7th. As Señor Carrillo has arrived in Lima, and as you have conferred with him upon the desires and expectations of his government, it is not necessary for me to elaborate views and present facts with which you are entirely familiar. I desire, however, to say—

First. That so far as I can judge, my journey to La Paz and conference with the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs was opportune and productive of good results. A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian Government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Señor Balmaceda. The purport of this paper had been, according to what Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo stated to me, greatly misunderstood, and they expressed themselves as pleased with my explanation and with what they at once admitted to be the just and true meaning of the protocol. I am inclined to think that the sensitiveness, natural to a small country like Bolivia, accounted in large measure for the feeling of the government upon this subject. In all our diplomatic correspondence, in the comments of the press of the United States and of Europe, the war has been constantly spoken of as one between Chili and Peru, and the implied slight had, in Bolivian public opinion, been aggravated by the fact that Bolivia was, in the protocol, referred to only in the most casual manner. This feeling was sensibly diminished by the fact that you had, on leaving Chili, at once sent me to La Paz, being unable at that time to make the journey in person, as I took care to explain to Señor Zilveti.

Second. While the war has, up to this time, not been carried on within the limits of Bolivia, and she has for this reason suffered, in comparison with her ally, but slight direct injury, yet it is of very great importance to the country that either a truce or peace should be made, as speedily as possible. Business is at a stand-still; exports from the country, which were for a time entirely suspended, are now permitted by the Chilian authorities only upon payment of onerous duties, and imports are, I think, still, or at all events were very recently, absolutely prohibited. As the government depends for the greater portion of its revenues upon foreign commerce, and as, owing to the state of war, a larger army than usual is now being maintained, the taxation is necessarily increased, and this naturally tends to produce irritation; the danger of revolution (always great) is enhanced, and the continuance of orderly government imperiled. The war has, however, taught the Bolivians (if such a lesson can be learned in so short a time as has elapsed since the downfall of Daza, and if I am to believe the statements of Señor Zilveti) that constitutional and honest government is a possibility, and the men who are truly patriotic, and who desire a well established state, profess themselves as being greatly encouraged by the present public feeling in Bolivia.

Third. Should it prove impossible to save her present littoral (the province of Atacama) to Bolivia, and I do not see how this can be done—and if, as Señor Del Valle and as other prominent Peruvians with whom I have conversed think, Peru is not willing

to sell or exchange for other territory a portion of her sea-coast—if, in short, as the result of the war, Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia's existence as an independent nation are few in number. It is true that Bolivia might find an outlet for a large part of her products, and perhaps an inlet for imports by the river Amazon and the Atlantic Ocean, but for this a large expenditure of money in the construction of railways and the deepening of rivers and the lapse of many years for the completion of the undertaking is necessary; even then her commerce in going to and from the ocean must pass through other countries, and those countries may see fit to impose vexatious duties, and impose other restrictions upon her trade, which would seriously hamper if not destroy it. Nor, supposing this untrue, are the financial resources or public credit of Bolivia equal to this undertaking; and it is more than probable that before its completion, surrounding states, covetous of her territory, would have secured her partition.

Moreover, the geographical position of Bolivia requires, in any event, an outlet upon the Pacific. I am aware that for many years her commerce has not sought ingress and egress by way of her own sea-coast. The ports of Mollendo and Arica have offered superior advantages, but Atacama has proved a valuable check upon Peru, and has prevented her from seriously overtaxing Bolivian imports and exports, fearful lest, should she do so, the country's trade would desert Mollendo and Arica and find refuge in Autofogasta and the other sea-ports of Bolivia. Compacts and agreements were made between the two countries, by which a certain portion of the revenues collected from Bolivian goods at Peruvian ports was to be paid to the former country. At the outbreak of the war, Peru owed Bolivia on this account more than four hundred thousand silver roles (Peruvian dollars). This fact serves to show how unsatisfactory in the past, and how probably unsatisfactory in the future, would be any commercial treaties giving to Bolivia only outlet and inlet through Peru.

Without considering the question as to whether it is best for the interests of the United States and of the world that the nationality of Bolivia should be preserved, I venture to express the opinion that the most feasible way by which, at the present time, her dismemberment can be avoided is by a strong and effective confederation between Peru and Bolivia, preserving to each an independent national existence, but making such an identity of interest as shall render imperative the strict fulfillment of any obligations and treaties into which they may enter. It seems to me that the self-interest of those countries would tend to such an end. Peru fears gradual absorption of her territory by Chili; Bolivia fears her own dismemberment by and division among surrounding nations. Traditions and natural national jealousies would render impossible any close union; self-preservation and resultant benefit would strongly urge upon each the course which I have suggested. I am not unaware of the fact that the interest of Chili would lead her to strongly oppose such a confederation, but, as I have offered this merely in the nature of personal opinion, and as you are better informed than myself, and a better judge of the advantage and practicability of such a political step, I do not consider it necessary to discuss the subject further.

In conclusion, permit me to observe that I cannot but think it of the greatest importance, both to ourselves and to the belligerents, that the United States should, as speedily as practicable, decide what course it will take with regard to the war of the Pacific. It was most embarrassing not to be able to inform Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo of the views of my government, as I felt that the great interests of Bolivia now at stake entitled them to ask and to expect a speedy answer, and I think that both for our own prestige and as a matter of justice, Bolivia should not be compelled to wait for longer time than is necessary for a definite decision on the part of the United States.

I further recommend that for the future our minister to Bolivia should be kept fully informed as to the policy of his government and of any action which may be taken by his colleagues at Lima and at Santiago. The unfortunately almost directly contradictory official communications made at one time by our ministers to Chili and Peru would have made the position of General Adams, in Bolivia, had he not fortunately been absent on leave, extremely embarrassing. Without full knowledge and concert of action on the part of our diplomatic representatives any final settlement by our government or any assistance in the solution of this question is rendered almost impossible.

I have the honor, &c.,

WALKER BLAINE.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 4.]

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Trescot.

No. 1.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Arequipa, Peru, March 28, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that we arrived in the harbor of Mollendo on Sunday, the 26th instant, between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. Mr. Cochran, the agent of the Mollendo and Puno Railway at that place, visited the ship shortly after our arrival, and most kindly placed the facilities of his road at our disposition. Learning that General Adams was at Arequipa, I telegraphed him to await me at that point, and, in accordance with arrangements made by Mr. Cochran, left Mollendo by special train at eight o'clock Monday morning, Captain Belknap and servant, Lieutenant Hale and Dr. Whiting, of the United States steamer Alaska, accompanying Mr. Cuthbert Trescot and myself. Half way between Mollendo and Arequipa we were met by General Adams, who accompanied us to Arequipa, where we arrived about four o'clock in the afternoon. On arriving we were met by the adjutant of Señor Carrillo (now the representative in this section of the government of Vice-President Montero), who accompanied us to our hotel. This morning Señor Carrillo called upon us in person, and I have just come from returning his visit. We have been received with great courtesy and cordiality by all the officials of the government, and those connected with the railway have very kindly placed at our disposition all the facilities afforded by their line.

By appointment, I this morning met Señor Juan C. Carrillo and had a long conference with him. He was formerly minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, and represented that country at the Arica conference. He is now accredited by Bolivia as minister near the government of Peru and Chili, and is thus far on his way to those countries. Señor Carrillo began by saying that he desired to speak with all frankness and confidence, in which I told him I would heartily concur. He then asked General Adams to read me a letter which he had on the twenty-fifth instant addressed to the general, a copy and translation of which you will find inclosed, marked inclosure 1 and 2. Having listened to the translation of the letter by General Adams, I replied in substance as follows:

"In order, Señor Carrillo, to make a satisfactory and full explanation of and answer to the question contained in your letter, I will begin by recalling to your mind that after the failure of the conference at Arica the United States still persisted in its effort to bring about a peace between Peru, Bolivia, and Chili. As the instructions given to Mr. Trescot have been made public, I can refer to them without embarrassment. From them you will have learned that the government of Garcia Calderon was recognized in Peru by the United States, as the latter power understood that such recognition was desired by Chili and would tend toward the establishment of peace. After the said government had been so recognized by the United States, Chili, without explanation and without notification to the United States, arrested Garcia Calderon and carried him as prisoner to Chili. You will, I think, agree with me that this act, thus unexplained, and in view of the attendant circumstances stated in Mr. Trescot's instructions, might well seem like one of intentional insult to the United States. Mr. Trescot was, therefore, instructed to frankly state to Chili the view which the United States was forced to hold of this arrest, and to request of the Government of Chili an explanation. This lay at the threshold of Mr. Trescot's mission, and was the first point discussed in his interview with Señor Balmaceda. After this had been fully discussed, and Chili had made explanation (and I beg you, sir, to remark that this question was one wholly and only concerning Chili and my government), the conversation turned upon what terms Chili was disposed to offer to Peru as a basis of peace. The conclusions thus reached were afterward summarized in the protocol to which you have referred in your letter. And here I beg you to observe that a protocol of this nature does not differ from a written memorandum of conversation, not being in any sense, as you seem to have understood, a contract or binding agreement. It is not with us the custom to seal such memoranda, but Señor Balmaceda stated that it was the diplomatic usage in South America so to do, and Mr. Trescot assented to it, observing that the seal could add nothing to its force."

"It will perhaps, however, be more satisfactory to examine the protocol itself, which states:

"First. The question of Garcia Calderon, which is of interest only to the United States and Chili is disposed of.

"Second. The question of armed intervention (in effect a declaration of war) is not within the province of diplomacy, and is, therefore, not contemplated by the mission of Mr. Trescot. I cannot but think that such a question is never within the purview of any diplomatic mission.

"Third. The United States will offer mediation (which is almost identical with arbi-

tration) only when conducive to the good of all the belligerents, and when asked by all. Chili states that she does not desire it, and therefore the United States does not offer it.

"Fourth. Referring to the question of good offices Chili states that if the United States will offer them on the basis proposed by herself (Chili) all facilities at her command in Peru shall be extended to Mr. Trescot.

"Fifth. The terms on which Chili will make peace with Peru are stated.

"Finally, it is stated that Mr. Trescot thought it best to telegraph to his government as to whether the good offices should be offered on the conditions named, and awaits a reply, which reply, forming part of the protocol and published at the same time, is stated in Mr. Trescot's letter to Señor Balmaceda. The effect of this reply, you will at once see, was to render the whole protocol blank paper, for in any event and on any supposition, but the first three articles can be regarded as in any way binding, and of these the first states simply a question which concerns the United States and Chili alone, and the second and third enunciate principles recognized in all international law. Mr. Trescot was, therefore, entirely correct when he wrote to Mr. Adams what I now state to you, that nothing had been signed which in any way bound the United States as to its action in this matter.

"Further, permit me to say that this will fully explain why Bolivia is not mentioned in the protocol, for it is evident that if the United States could not offer its good offices to bring about peace with Peru on the bases proposed by Chili, there was no need of discussing the Bolivian question. If the offer of Chili with regard to Peru was accepted, then the Bolivian question would naturally come up next in order for discussion.

"One matter further: The United States has replied to Mr. Trescot's telegram, stating that she cannot offer good offices or take any part in bringing about a peace based upon both money indemnification and a cession of territory, and that the question as to the future action of the United States has been referred to Congress, and while awaiting the decision of that body it has seemed good to Mr. Trescot to himself go to Peru and to send me to Bolivia, in order to ascertain the intentions and desires of those governments with regard to peace.

"I ought perhaps to add that it was not intended that the protocol referred to should be made public, but, the essential portions having been published in the United States by some mistake (as they were communicated in a confidential cipher dispatch), Mr. Trescot did not consider that he could refuse permission to Señor Balmaceda to publish the entire document."

Mr. Carrillo therefore replied that he was pleased to hear my explanation, and he would state to me with frankness and in confidence what were the views of his government and people. He said that they had been led to believe from the declarations of Mr. Hurlbut in Peru (for during the time Mr. Adams was absent from Bolivia) that the United States would not, in any event, permit peace upon the basis of annexation of territory, and that Bolivia had patiently awaited the result of the influence of the United States, not expecting a forcible intervention, but led to believe that our government would lend its moral influence, as it had done with so much effect in the case of Mexico; that after his return to Bolivia, in the early part of January last, Mr. Adams had informed the government of the mission of Mr. Trescot, and had requested, to which the government had cheerfully acceded, that pending the result of your negotiations in Santiago things might remain *in statu quo;* that just about this time Señor Baptista had been sent as delegate from Bolivia to the proposed congress in Central America, and that secret instructions had been given him to converse, while on his journey, with any men of prominence with whom he might meet in Chili or Peru, that he might inform the Government of Bolivia as to the views of these countries with regard to peace; that at Tacna, Señor Baptista had met Señor Lillo, who, on behalf of Chili, had proposed that peace should be made between his government and Bolivia, to which Señor Baptista replied that his government would not make peace, save after consultation with and with the approval of Peru, and had suggested, speaking for himself, that it seemed best to make a truce rather than a peace; that conferences had been held, and that certain conclusions, subject to the approval of his government, had been assented to by Señor Baptista, but that the Government of Bolivia, would never have agreed to peace, even with the consent of Peru, and this independent of any suggestion or request on the part of Mr. Adams. He also gave me to understand that Chili had offered to cede Tacna, Arica, and Pisagua to Bolivia (all this territory being Peruvian), in exchange for Atacama. Further continuing, Señor Carrillo said that we could not regard it as strange, in view of the attitude of the United States, if Bolivia felt that the time had arrived when it was wise for her to make the best terms possible for herself and by herself, supposing that the United States had finally withdrawn from the question.

I replied that I did not understand that the United States had as yet definitely decided its future policy, and requested him to state to me the intentions of Bolivia.

In answer, he said that he would state them frankly, but begged that his views

might be regarded as personal and confidential. He said that, first, it might be advantageous to consider that the same results could be brought about, without offending either Peru or Bolivia, by a careful use of language. For example, Bolivia could cede territory to Chili, provided it was regarded as in lieu of a money indemnity, and not as a right of conquest; for to affirm the latter proposition to be a recognized principle would, in effect, place the territory of Bolivia at the mercy of any nation stronger than herself, rather than do which she would prefer the immediate termination of a national existence. I replied that I thought that I could safely affirm that my government would never take part in any negotiation for peace which recognized cession of territory, without any other consideration, as the legitimate result of victory in war. He then added that it was absolutely essential to Bolivia to have a free and independent outlet and inlet upon the Pacific, the reasons for which he detailed, but which it is not necessary for me now to repeat. With these considerations as premises, he thought his government would make peace on the following conditions:

1st. Recognizing indemnization as the right of the victor in war.

2d. The indemnity due from Bolivia to Chili shall be fixed at a definite sum, and in default of payment, Chili shall be allowed to take Atacama; the fact shall also be recognized that, as a result of the war, a new demarkation of boundaries between the three nations has become necessary, and that the natural affinity of Atacama to Chili, arising from population and proximity, may be regarded in settling the demarkation.

3d. Bolivia desires, for the purpose of procuring a port upon the Pacific, to make an independent treaty with Peru by which, in exchange for Tacna and Arica, she would give the province of Caupolican, bordering upon Lake Titicaca and contiguous to Peru, and possibly would assume a portion of her debt or pay an additional compensation in money, the details to be hereafter arranged between the two countries.

Reverting to previous conversation, Señor Carrillo then inquired as to what I thought would be the attitude of my government upon the question.

I told him that I could not form an opinion; that it was within the bounds of possibility that Congress, to which body I understood that the question had been referred, might decide to withdraw altogether, or to intervene with effect; that I had no information or intimation on which to predicate an opinion; that, possibly, so indefinite a reply might be somewhat embarrassing to his government, but that a definite decision would, in all probability, be reached by the United States in a short time, and that it did not seem to me that a maintenance of affairs *in statu quo* for a limited period could seriously hamper or prove detrimental to Bolivia.

In this he concurred and informed me that he was accredited both to Chili and Peru, and, for the purpose of conferring with you and with the government of Peru, would gladly at once proceed to Lima, but was prevented from doing so for certain reasons. (See my dispatch numbered 2.) He also said that he was empowered by his government, on the understanding that the United States had entirely withdrawn from the question, to request the aid of the Argentine Republic, Brazil, or any other American power, and failing in this to request the intervention of Europe, and inquired of me what opinion my government would entertain of the latter course.

I replied that the traditional policy of the United States had ever viewed with disfavor European intervention upon this hemisphere, and that unless this policy had been radically overturned (of which I was not informed), it could not but view such a step with disfavor. This was the substance of our conversation.

I inquired of Señor Carrillo as to whether I was at liberty to refer to it in the conference which I hope to have in La Paz with Señor Zilveti, Bolivian minister of Foreign Affairs, to which he replied that, though he did not doubt that I would find Señor Zilveti's opinions to be identical, he preferred that the latter should express them voluntarily and spontaneously. I therefore take advantage of the mail, which I am informed leaves to-morrow for Callao, to send this for your guidance and information, and will report further after my return from La Paz.

I have concluded to go thither, and shall leave for Puno at six o'clock to-morrow morning. I have made arrangements which will, I trust, bring me to Mollendo on Monday or Tuesday next, and shall join you in Lima as quickly as possible. It seems to me to be more respectful to proceed to the Bolivian capital, and I cannot but think it extremely doubtful as to whether you will personally be able to go there.

There are some incidental questions as to the effect of the Balmaceda protocol in Bolivia and other matters touched upon in our conversation, to which I do not now deem it necessary to refer, but which I will hereafter explain to you, either orally or in writing.

I have written hastily, but I trust I have made myself intelligible, and that what I said and its results may meet with your approval.

I am, &c.,

WALKER BLAINE.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.—Translation.]

Señor Carrillo to Mr. Adams.

LEGATION OF BOLIVIA,
Arequipa, March 25, 1882.

SIR: The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia accredited near the Government of Peru, is informed of the early arrival of Mr. Walker Blaine at the port of Mollendo, charged with a special mission from the United States, in order to have an interview with Your Excellency, and, as the distance prevents the Government of Bolivia from taking advantage of this opportunity to obtain some data necessary to the development of its policy, the undersigned takes the liberty of asking Your Excellency to please to make clear in the said interview the points contained in this letter.

In the protocol of the 11th of February last, signed by the Chilian minister of Foreign Affairs and His Excellency Mr. W. H. Trescot, Special Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, it is stated that "the mediation (of the United States) does not conform to the convenience of the belligerents, nor is it solicited by Chili," and it is added that, eliminating from all discussion the possibility of armed intervention, the United States "will offer its mediation only in case that the belligerents shall manifest a desire of obtaining it, and when its acceptance will conduce to results satisfactory to both." At the same time it is declared, in the third clause, that the *mediation of the United States is a point eliminated from all discussion and definitely concluded.*

Notwithstanding that the allied governments have shown by their official acts a respectful deference to the conciliatory policy of the United States, confiding in its efficacious influence for the restoration of peace, the declaration just recited leads one to consider that the new action upon which the government of Your Excellency entered, after the conference at Arica, in the present international conflict upon the Pacific, is definitely ended and withdrawn.

This consideration and the fact that no mention is made of the republic of Bolivia in the conference at Santiago, nor in the agreement signed at Viña del Mar, notwithstanding that, in consequence of the declarations made by your excellency in your respectful note of the 10th of January last, addressed to the Bolivian cabinet, all action was suspended until the result of the mission of Mr. Trescot should be made known, have determined the undersigned to interest Your Excellency in order that, in your approaching interview with Mr. Blaine, the reasons may, so far as possible, be made clear why Bolivia was not mentioned in the matters already referred to, and at the same time a declaration may be obtained as to the true meaning and extent of the conclusions of the aforesaid protocol relative to the mediation of the Government of the United States with regard to the three belligerent nations. The undersigned does not doubt that Your Excellency will entertain the present suggestion, as it will show the Government of Bolivia another proof of that delicate attention which Your Excellency has shown in the discharge of the duties of your high office.

With every consideration, &c.,

JOAN C. CARRILLO.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 4. Translation of inclosure 2.]

(Private copy.)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA.

In the city of La Paz, on the 1st of April, 1882, in accordance with an agreement made the previous day, Mr. Walker Blaine with General Adams, minister resident of the United States, met Doctor Pedro José Zilveti, in the office of the minister of foreign affairs for Bolivia. The Minister commenced by asking Mr. Blaine what character they would give to the interview, to which he replied that he had instructions from the Plenipotentiary, Mr. Trescot, to ascertain the opinions and intentions of the Government of Bolivia, and that the conference would, therefore, be entirely confidential.

Señor Zilveti having signified his wish to know the extent and importance of the protocol of February 11th, signed by Messrs. Trescot and Balmaceda, Mr. Blaine made the same statements that he did, in reference to this matter, in his interview of March 28th with Señor Carrillo, stating, therefore, as a conclusion, that there was entire freedom of action for American diplomacy, in conformity with the friendly character of its relations towards the three belligerent nations. Señor Zilveti was permitted to ask Mr. Blaine what position the United States would take if Chili persisted in demanding the conditions of peace set forth in the protocol of the 11th of February, which on the part of Bolivia are absolutely inadmissible. The reply was as follows: The government of the United States sincerely desires the cessation of the actual war, but does not find itself in a position to itself assume a warlike attitude, because it does not desire to make

war, nor do the American people desire it; that for this reason, if the indicated conditions were not modified and the demand of cession of territory were maintained by Chili as the right of a conqueror and as a condition, *sine qua non*, of a settlement, the Government of the United States could do nothing more than to retire completely. (See foot note.) Señor Zilveti replied that he did not think that the point could be reached. That the United States would have to declare war against Chili, because one determined word from the former government would suffice to bring the conqueror to reason and make him consent to an equitable and satisfactory arrangement. He called attention, besides, to the fact that the retirement of the United States in such a case would make worse the condition of the allies and make another victory for Chili.

Señor Zilveti, being asked upon what base Bolivia would enter into an arrangement for the cessation of the present war which causes so much injury to the belligerents, replied, that, according to the conditions imposed by Chili, it would amount to a perpetual closing in of Bolivia, its deprivation of every outlet upon the Pacific, and its consequent death; that Bolivia could accept no such arrangement, preferring to indefinitely maintain a defensive attitude; but that, in his opinion, a preliminary arrangement for peace might be made, recognizing the right to a just indemnity, the mode and payment of which would be matter for a future international contract, the express declaration being made that the right of conquest was not recognized, and that this must be done without impairing the loyalty which Bolivia owes Peru, in accordance with their treaty of alliance.

Referring to the case of an absolute impossibility of arriving at any definite agreement, and of the wisdom of stipulating for an armistice or temporary truce, Mr. Blaine asked on what conditions Bolivia would accept it. Señor Zilveti replied that he could not say with certainty what these conditions would be, but, as his own private opinion, he might say that, in the event of treating for a truce jointly with Peru, the war occupation should be limited to the department of Tarapacá and the littoral of Bolivia, a neutral zone should be determined, liberty and necessary guarantees given that Peru may be organized in a stable manner, and liberty of commerce accorded to Bolivia, through its own and Peruvian ports, in accordance with the existing treaties between the two nations. Señor Zilveti having asked if it was true that Mr. Trescot, in his special mission, expected new instructions from his government, and if they would be soon communicated, Mr. Blaine replied that they were actually expected, but that they could not be given until after the Congress of the United States, to which the question had been submitted for its consideration, should have passed upon it, and that he thought it improbable that this would be done immediately, since to obtain some exact information Mr. Hurlbut had been summoned home, and was to leave Lima on the 6th of April.

Referring to the mission of Señor Carrillo, with whom Mr. Blaine had conversed in Arequipa, Señor Zilveti stated that if Chili sincerely wished to enter into an arrangement leading to a solution of the present conflict, she would give Señor Carrillo a passport and the necessary guarantees that he might put himself in a communication with the Government of Peru, to which he has been accredited. Mr. Blaine said that he thought so too, and had, on his part, addressed Mr. Trescot from Arequipa, recommending him to obtain from the Chilian authorities all the guarantees wished for, that Señor Carrillo might proceed to the fulfillment of his mission.

Here the confidential interview, of which this is a brief summary, ended.

Approved.

JENARO SANJINES,
Chief Clerk of Foreign Affairs.

NOTE.—The statement made by me was that, in the present complicated condition of affairs, Chili would not yield her claim to the cession of Tarapacá, unless compelled to do so by a manifestation on the part of the United States of a purpose to force her to that determination; that neither the people nor the Government of the United States had ever contemplated the possibility of assuming a warlike attitude.

W. BLAINE.

No. 37.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

LIMA, *May* 12, 1882.

FRELINGHUYSEN, *Washington:*

Will leave upon the Lackawanna on 14th, Panama 24th. Admiral of the fleet requests you will inform Secretary of the Navy.

TRESCOT.

No. 38.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 26.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Washington, D. C., June 5, 1882.

SIR: In dispatch No. 24, dated Lima, May 3, 1882, I inclosed an account of my interviews with Señor Alvarez, the Peruvian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the letter which in consequence I addressed to the Chilian Government.

The purpose of that letter was to urge upon the Chilian Government the acceptance of the preliminary conditions which the Peruvian Government thought necessary to the initiation of a serious negotiation for peace.

The conditions were:

1. That General Montero should be recognized as the executive head of an actual government.

2. That, under the provisions of a short truce, he should be afforded the opportunity to convene the National Congress at Arequipa, in order that he might receive from it the authority necessary for the conclusion of a peace.

My reasons for the representation made to the Chilian Government in this connection have been so fully stated in my dispatch to the Department, and in the communication to the Chilian Government, that they need not now be repeated.

It only remains for me to state what consideration has so far been given to the proposed conditions.

For reasons which have been stated in former dispatches, I was obliged to leave Lima before my communication in its formal shape could reach the Chilian Government at Santiago. But that government has in Lima a diplomatic representative in the person of Señor Novoa, who is authorized to consider any propositions tending to a negotiation for peace.

The whole subject was fully discussed with him and General Lynch, the military commander of the Chilian army of occupation, and the propositions, with the substance of the conference, were telegraphed by Señor Novoa to his government.

I do not regard the telegraphic reply which was communicated by Señor Novoa as conclusive. My dispatches had not yet reached the Chilian Government, and I think it clear that the bare statement of the propositions had not put the Chilian Government in full possession of the considerations which recommended their adoption. I have other reasons for believing that the question is still an open one.

The reply of the Government of Chili, as communicated by Señor Novoa, intimated:

1. That as no active military operations were being conducted by the Chilian army, there were was no apparent necessity for a truce. But it is obvious that, as Arequipa is open at any moment to occupation by the Chilian troops from Mollendo, the Peruvian Congress would naturally and properly require some guaranteethat its deliberations should be free and uninterrupted. A repetition of the dissolution of Congress because its deliberations were not agreeable to the Chilian Government, is a contingency which the Congress, in view of the past, could scarcely disregard, and which would make any effort at negotiation only another unfortunate failure. Beside which, if there are, and are to be, no active

military operations, there can be no possible danger or inconvenience to Chili in giving such a condition of things the sanction of a formal agreement by a short notice.

2. While the Chilian Government desired peace, it was unwilling to enter upon negotiation without distinct agreement in advance of the terms which must be accepted. It was dissatisfied with the experience of its former attempts at negotiation with the Calderon government and was indisposed to renew the effort without the certainty of a successful result. It was willing, therefore, to negotiate informally with General Montero, and upon the signature of satisfactory preliminaries would recognize the existence of the Peruvian Government, *pari passu*, with the execution of the treaty.

But the Congress which had authorized General Montero to negotiate had expressly forbidden any cession of territory, and it was, therefore, simply impossible for General Montero to sign a treaty containing such provisions. After some discussion Señor Novoa expressed his willingness to accept a preliminary agreement by which General Montero would bind himself to submit for approval, to the national Congress, such a treaty as he and Señor Novoa could agree upon, and to recognize General Montero's government upon the execution of such an instrument. This would have afforded an opportunity for the opening of negotiations, but Señor Novoa added the limitation that if the Congress did not approve the treaty so submitted, the recognition would be withdrawn. This was simply an impossible condition. The recognition of the Montero government had to be positive. If Congress failed to approve, Chili could still prosecute the war until Peru was compelled to accept her terms, but such a contingent recognition was in fact only the old proposition of a treaty before recognition in another and much more illogical and embarrassing shape. Señor Novoa was willing to adopt another method. He would sign a treaty with General Montero to be submitted and approved by the municipalities, that is, by the local authorities of the separate provinces. Such a method was entirely beyond General Montero's constitutional powers and would, I think, have led to the renewal of the differences between the various parties in Peru, who, accepting General Montero as the legitimate representative of the government, would acquiesce in the regular action of the Executive and Congress.

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As Señor Novoa was either indisposed or unauthorized to move out of this vicious circle, our conferences terminated.

I regret this the more as I think the propositions offered a fair prospect of a serious negotiation. Chili cannot obtain a peace which will give sanction and title to her acquisition of territory without the recognition of a legitimate government in Peru. Without a treaty with such authority the acquisition will be simply one of force to be maintained as it has been acquired. The recognition of General Montero's government will place upon him, and upon the people of Peru, the responsibility of making or rejecting peace while the calling of Congress will afford the opportunity to those who desire peace to do what they cannot do under present circumstances; organize a party which can exert its influence directly, effectively, and legitimately in the Congress itself.

But I cannot with justice conclude this dispatch without saying that I believe the reason which induces the hesitation of Chili is that she believes that, so long as the Peruvians are convinced that the United States will finally intervene, they never will negotiate in earnest.

It is unquestionably true that the Peruvian Government does believe that the United States will intervene; at any rate they consider that the question of intervention, as one of their leading officials expressed it to me, was still a pending question.

It is obvious that neither Chili nor Peru will approach the solution of their difficulties in the proper spirit, or with any hope of a result satisfactory to both, as long as this impression lasts.

If the United States intend to intervene effectively to prevent the disintegration of Peru, the time has come when that intention should be avowed. If it does not, still more urgent is the necessity that Chili and Peru should understand exactly where the action of the United States ends. It would be entirely beyond my duty to discuss the character or the consequences of either line of conduct, but I trust that you will not deem that I am going beyond that duty in impressing upon the government that the present position of the United States is an embarrassment to all the belligerents, and that it should be terminated as promptly as possible.

There is another conviction which it is clearly my duty to express. I believe that whenever the United States formally withdraws from further intervention Peru will apply to the European powers, and that a joint intervention of two or more is probable. It is not for me to anticipate what view the Department will take of such a possibility.

I have, &c.,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

No. 39.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 27.] SPECIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA,
Washington, D. C., June 10, 1882.

SIR: I herewith inclose a copy of a communication just received from Señor Alvarez, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Peru, and have the honor to be your obedient servant,

WM. HENRY TRESCOT.

[Inclosure in No. 27.—Translation.]

HUARAZ, *May* 10, 1882.

Mr. MINISTER: The representatives of Your Excellency's government in Peru, and those of the government of this country, have on various occasions informed your government of the cruelty and the act of vandalism with which the Chilian forces carry on hostilities against our defenseless people. The recital of a portion of these acts of barbarity has now been published, being contained in the volume of official documents published by Your Excellency's government, in relation to the war on the Pacific coast. The Hon. Mr. Christiancy, in giving an account of these acts, refers to them with deep emotion. I will quote a few passages from his communications:

"Last week a Chilian force of from two to three thousand men marched from Ilo to Mollendo, and with some marines who were near, or who arrived there about that time, they completely burned, sacked, and destroyed the town, railway and railway station, wantonly destroying the lives of peaceable inhabitants."

"The orders given by the Chilian Government to their fleet to destroy all the Peruvian ports can hardly be carried out without great inhumanity and even barbarity, and that towards neutrals." (March 23, 1880, page 325.)

Referring to other outrages, he says:

"This mode of carrying on the war by Chili has produced a strong feeling here among all the representatives of foreign powers.

"I shall readily join in protesting against all such means as are supported only by savage or semi-barbarous practices of past ages, but condemned by the more humane codes of modern warfare. Humanity has some rights even higher than those of belligerents.' (March 24, 1880, page 327.)

"This is not war, but deliberate, wholesale murder, unprovoked by anything yet done by the allied forces, and, in the cause of civilization and humanity, calls for an indignant protest from all civilized nations." (July 5, 1880, page 330.)

"If Chili chooses to employ savages as soldiers she must be held responsible before the world for all such excesses as would not have been committed by a civilized soldiery under proper discipline." (February 2, 1881, page 438.)

Your Excellency sees for yourself in the vicinity of Lima the traces of this barbarous warfare.

It now becomes my painful duty to call Your Excellency's attention to a fresh outrage of this kind, which has just been committed in the province of Jauja by the Chilian forces which are overrunning that territory.

The commander of those forces, whose name is E. del Canto, sent on the 6th of April last an artful communication to various towns in that province, telling them that the Chilian forces had not come for the purpose of making war upon the poor, but upon the rich, so as to compel them to sue for peace. (Inclosure No. 1.)

The object of this communistic proclamation was to induce the Indians to plunder the property of the wealthy classes in order that the Chilian forces might thus be supplied with beef cattle. To this wily missive intimidation was added, Mr. del Canto informing the Indians that he had caused their principal men in those districts to be placed under arrest.

Finding that his insinuations were of no avail, del Canto proceeded to commit an act of the most barbarous cruelty. He invaded those defenseless villages with a force of two thousand men and butchered the inhabitants, without sparing either age or sex. He drove those who escaped the murderous knife to the mountains, thus depriving them of shelter and of every means of subsistence. (Inclosure No. 2.)

The inclosed copies of reports received by the government will give Your Excellency a fuller view of these horrors. These copies are not authenticated, because the parties who sent them feared the evils to which they would have been subjected if the papers had been intercepted.

It seems scarcely credible, the war being *de facto* at an end, for the simple reason that Peru is unable to continue it, and in presence of Your Excellency's mission of peace, that such acts of atrocity are possible.

Your Excellency will observe that this officer, del Canto, molds the policy of his government in the most inhuman manner.

The revelation of such cruel proceedings and of such wicked purposes will, I hope, be an additional incentive to Your Excellency's government to increase its laudable efforts to bring about a peace without usurpations on the part of Chili. It is not possible that Your Excellency's government should witness unmoved the execution of this horrible design: "Either the conquest of a portion of our territory or the butchery of its inhabitants." It cannot be that these atrocities are to go on year after year before the very eyes of the United States in spite of their denunciation by the Hon. Mr. Christiancy

In the mean time I likewise hope that Your Excellency, with the sense of justice which characterizes you, will for the honor of humanity endeavor, so far as you are able, to put an end to these revolting deeds.

With sentiments of the most distinguished consideration, I am, &c.,

MO. ALVAREZ.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

No. 108.] HUANCAYO, *April* 6, 1882.

To the chief of the communities of Vinca, Moya, Cocra, Laran, and others on the heights of Chongos:

The Chilian forces have not come to make war upon or to oppress the poor. The sole object of their coming has been to compel the rich to sue for that peace which is so necessary in order that the poor may be able to pursue their labors without molestation.

In view of the fact that the Chilian forces have been living almost at the expense of the poor, and as the Government of Huancayo was badly disarranged, the notables have been placed under arrest.

What is desired is that the rich should give what they ought; consequently, the chief of the communities on the other side is requested to send commissioners to the

principal estates for the purpose of bringing beef cattle, so that those which have been taken from the poor may be restored to them, and that some may be left for the subsistence of the Chilian forces.

The chief of the communities is further requested to inform his people that they may retire to their villages with the certainty that the Chilian forces will do them no harm.

A reply is requested.

God guard you.

E. DEL CANTO.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM MR. WALKER BLAINE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

No. 40.

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Blaine.

Separate. Unnumbered.

PANAMA, UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA, *December* 12, 1881.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a cable dispatch informing me that the President has been pleased to designate me as chargé d'affaires in Chili, pending the arrival of a new minister to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of the late minister, General Kilpatrick, and stating that credentials and instructions were mailed from Washington on Friday last.

I am also requested by Mr. Trescot, envoy extraordinary, &c., to acknowledge to you the receipt by him of cable message, in which the same information is given him, and in which he is requested to proceed to Santiago with as little delay as possible.

We are at present waiting at this point until the U. S. steamer Lackawanna shall be supplied with coal, and shall proceed with all possible speed immediately thereafter to Santiago.

The captain of the Lackawanna to-day informed Mr. Trescot that he hoped to leave this port to-morrow, or, at latest, on Wednesday next, and that the voyage to Valparaiso could not in all probability be made in less than twenty-five days, as he would be obliged to stop at Callao to replenish the supply of coal. This calculation would indicate some day between the fifth and tenth of January next as the probable date of arrival in Santiago.

Mr. Trescot desires me to say that he shall proceed with all possible expedition to Chili, and that while for the reason above given he is not able to avoid putting in at Callao, he will exercise every precaution to avoid embarrassing the success of his mission by such action.

As it will be impossible for the instructions forwarded to me from the Department of State, and without which I cannot act as chargé d'affaires at Santiago, to reach that city before the tenth of January next, I think I can safely assure you that I shall be in Santiago in advance of my instructions.

As I am further informed by your cable message that the duties of chargé d'affaires will not prevent me from aiding Mr. Trescot in the special mission, I shall be governed by his wishes and commands, unless further instructions from the Department should countermand those issued to me before my departure from Washington.

I am, sir, &c.,

WALKER BLAINE,
Third Assistant Secretary of State.

No. 41.

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 1.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Santiago de Chili, January 13, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to announce my arrival at Valparaiso, Chili, on Wednesday, the 4th instant, and at Santiago (the two days intervening having been spent in Valparaiso) on Saturday, the 7th of January.

I received on Tuesday evening a letter from the Secretary of State (Mr. Blaine) instructing me to take charge of this legation until the arrival of a new minister, and inclosed therewith a letter addressed to the minister of foreign affairs of this republic, accrediting me as chargé d'affaires of the Government of the United States. The latter I presented on Wednesday last (January 11) to Señor Balmaceda, secretary of state for foreign affairs for this government, and I have to-day been verbally informed by Mr. Balmaceda that the Chilian Government recognizes me in that capacity.

When at Valparaiso, Mr. Foote, consul of the United States at that port, delivered to me certain correspondence addressed to General Kilpatrick, late United States minister to Chili, of which he took possession after the death of the latter, as well as certain instructions from the Department of State received after the death of General Kilpatrick. I also received from Mr. Foote the cypher of the Department of State, belonging to this legation, for which proper receipt is herewith inclosed.

Upon arriving at Santiago, Mrs. Kilpatrick gave to me the instructions received by her husband, as well as the seal of the legation, the keys to the rooms now occupied as such, and divers other articles, the property of the legation of the United States in Chili. I shall transmit by next mail a full inventory of all the property found by me in the legation of the United States in this city.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt at this legation of instructions addressed to Mr. Osborn, numbered 134 and 135. From General Foote, consul at Valparaiso, I received instructions addressed by the Department of State to Mr. Kilpatrick, numbered 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. These instructions had not been opened up to the time of my arrival, having been received after the death of our late minister. By the mail received Wednesday came Department's instruction No. 17, under cover to Mr. Kilpatrick, and received and opened by me. From Mrs. Kilpatrick I received Department's instructions addressed to Mr. Kilpatrick, numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. It will thus be seen that instructions from the Department of State to Mr. Kilpatrick numbered 1 and 10 are missing, and in order to render complete the archives of the legation, I respectfully request to be furnished with certified copies of the same.

In the book containing copies of Mr. Kilpatrick's dispatches to the Department of State I do not find copy of his dispatch numbered 1 I respectfully request to be furnished with a copy of this dispat that I may cause it to be transcribed in the records of the legatio

I beg to call the attention of the Secretary of State to one matter. At the time that Mr. Trescot was sent upon the pres sion it was deemed advisable to send me with him, as it wa that it might be necessary to conduct negotiations at mor

point at the same time. Since my departure, the death of Mr. Kilpatrick having occurred, the Department has been pleased to direct me to act as chargé d'affaires until the arrival of Mr. Kilpatrick's successor. I suppose that it is deemed inadvisable to send out a new minister until after the completion of Mr. Trescot's special mission. Should such be the case, it would naturally happen that no minister would arrive at this place until some two months after the departure of Mr. Trescot. I venture therefore to suggest to the Department that I be given permission, should no unforeseen complication arise, to place the archives in the hands of our consul at Valparaiso, and to return to the United States upon the conclusion of the special mission of Mr. Trescot. I cannot but think that I can by that time have so far completed the current business of the legation as to render it practicable for me to return without endangering or delaying the affairs of the United States in this country, and I do not desire to be absent for longer time than shall be necessary from my desk in the Department.

In this connection I beg to state that I do not desire, even if permissible, to receive compensation as chargé d'affaires of this legation. I shall draw before my departure from Chili, for the ordinary disbursements of the legation, to be charged to the account of incidental expenses, for which an allowance is made by the Department of State at the rate of four hundred dollars per year.

Deferring until the departure of the next mail a more detailed account of the condition and business of this legation.

I have, &c.,

WALKER BLAINE.

No. 42.

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 2.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Santiago de Chili, January 20, 1882.

SIR: Referring to Department's instruction No. 134, dated July 14, 1881, and addressed to Mr. Osborn, I beg to state that on the 17th day of September, 1881, Mr. John F. Van Ingen was recognized by the Chilian Government as consul at Talcahuana, Chili. I do not find from the record of dispatches forwarded by Mr. Kilpatrick that the Department has been so informed, and on that account forward this information.

Referring to the instruction of the Department numbered 13, dated November 22, 1881, and addressed to Mr. Kilpatrick, but never received by him, I have the honor, in accordance with the suggestion of said instruction, to forward herewith a copy of Mr. Balmaceda's note of October 8, 1881, to Mr. Kilpatrick, and a translation of the same.

I had hoped to be able to forward by this mail, as I indicated in my dispatch of the 13th, a full inventory of the property of the legation in this city, but am unfortunately obliged to postpone doing so until the next mail. It appears that from the time of his arrival at this post, until death, Mr. Kilpatrick was a constant sufferer from severe illness, owing to this a large amount of the current business of the legation, of practically slight importance however, was left undone. I have occupied myself during the past week with this and with aiding the clerk in such manner as he desired, and have not therefore been able to complete the inventory.

For the information of the Department, I transmit by this mail two copies of the report of the Chilian minister of foreign affairs to the Congress of 1881. They will be found to contain, among other matters of interest, a full report of the settlement of the boundary question with the Argentine Republic, with the correspondence relating thereto, a settlement in which our ministers here and at Buenos Ayres materially aided.

I have, &c.,

WALKER BLAINE.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.—Translation.]

Señor Balmaceda to Mr. Kilpatrick.

REPUBLIC OF CHILI, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Santiago de Chili, October 8, 1881.

SIR: The newspapers of Valparaiso and of this capital have published the memorandum which Mr. Hurlbut, the minister of the United States in Lima, on the 24th of August, of this present year, addressed to the chief of our army of occupation in that city, Rear-Admiral Lynch. The letter that your excellency knows of, and which Mr. Hurlbut inclosed with the memorandum, in which said gentleman commenced by saying to Rear-Admiral Lynch that in the conversation referred to in the memorandum, *he did not treat of diplomatic business*, has not been published with the memorandum.

My government has thought proper to call your attention to the irregularity of this conduct, attaching little importance to it in reality, as it is confident that the declarations contained in the memorandum are not the expression of the circumspect, noble, and loyal policy which the Government of the United States has observed toward the belligerents of the Pacific.

The strange publicity given to a document of very little confidential importance, taking into consideration the manner and circumstances under which it was produced, obliges me to address myself to you in order to obtain an answer that may officially establish the truth and sincerity of the relations that our respective governments so worthily cultivate.

The speech which Mr. Hurlbut made when presenting his credentials to the government of Garcia Calderon, now extinct, the *memorandum* addressed to Mr. Lynch when *he did not treat of diplomatic business*, his well known letter against Pierola, to whom Mr. Christiancy was accredited, and whose plenipotentiaries held a conference in Arica in the presence and with the full consent of the representatives of the United States, may produce deplorable confusion and give useless hopes to the enemy or stimulate them to a resistance fruitless for the results of the struggle, and in any case bloody.

Chili provoked to war, the property of its citizens confiscated and they inhumanly turned out of their homes, its industry destroyed by the thousands of hands that have left it, preferring to vindicate their rights and their honor; the very large sums employed for the maintenance of the struggle; the priceless blood of its sons spilt; the enemy routed, and on sea and land reduced to absolute and radical impotency, we will carry the war as far as it may be necessary to oblige the conquered to sign a peace; and in the settlement of peace, we will go, exercising our sovereignty, as far as it may be necessary to obtain the reparation due for the evils produced by the war, the future security in peace, and the permanent stability of the republic.

We will exercise, in all its fullness, the primitive right that authorizes us to fully guarantee our existence—a right continually confirmed by the practice of European powers and of the United States themselves—in America.

I am confident that our rights as a belligerent will be respected by the United States as much in the future as they have been up to this time. The conduct of its represent atives in Arica and all through the war, its friendly participation in the treaty th ended the question of boundary with the Argentine Republic, its worthy interna traditions, and the respect which, as a powerful nation, it owes especially to ir ent and sovereign states, perfectly assure me that the United States will performing its friendly acts if it wishes, but will always remain friendly the obstinate war that we are sustaining with our enemies of the Pacific.

Since motives foreign to the will of my government have created in th a state of uncertainty that may be misunderstood, and therefore occasi able incidents in the difficult circumstances that the state of war u the belligerents, I hope from your excellency the assurance that, in your instructions, you can give to my government about the reci

standing that exists, and which will be maintained unchangeable between the republics that we have the honor to represent.

It is grateful to subscribe myself, with feelings of the highest esteem and consideration for your excellency, your attentive and obedient servant,

J. M. BALMACEDA.

No. 43.

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

No. 7.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Viña del Mar, Chili, February 3, 1882..

SIR: Referring to Department's instructions numbered 15 and 17, addressed to Mr. Kilpatrick, I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with the permission given in a letter received from Mr. Trescot, a copy of which you will receive as an inclosure to his dispatch numbered 8, I availed myself of the interview appointed by Mr. Balmaceda, secretary of state for foreign affairs, with Mr. Trescot, and, with the latter's permission, accompanied him to Mr. Balmaceda on Tuesday last, the 31st ultimo.

After some remarks upon other topics by Mr. Balmaceda, Mr. Trescot stated to him the object for which I had come, saying to him:

You are doubtless aware, sir, of the friendly interest which the United States has for some time manifested in endeavoring to procure a concerted system of action on the part of the powers of the western continent which might lead to some united policy on their part tending to the perpetuation of peace, the avoidance of international wars, and possibly the settlement of disputed points by arbitration. During the past year the United States has been appealed to by Guatemala to exert its good offices in settling the question of boundary existing between Guatemala and the neighboring Republic of Mexico; it has been requested by Venezuela to assist her in regulating the question of her debt to foreign countries, and I venture to also call to your recollection the happy influence exerted by our ministers to Chili and to the Argentine Republic in aiding the two governments to harmoniously decide a question of boundary, which seemed, at one time, to threaten serious consequences. I mention these facts as showing the spirit in which the United States proffers the invitation, for the purpose of presenting which on the part of his government Mr. Blaine has accompanied me this morning. The invitation is dated in November, 1881, and the date of the congress is fixed for November of the present year. I desired, however, before permitting the presentation of the invitation to Chili, to make sure that the invitations to Bolivia and Peru were presented to those governments at the same time, as, if such an invitation should be presented to one government and not to either of the others, such a fact might, in the present condition of affairs between the three republics, lead to misunderstanding. The letter addressed to General Adams, instructing him to invite the Government of Bolivia, was among the intercepted dispatches which came into my hands last week. As I am now assured that the letter will reach General Adams, and, as I am informed that Mr. Hurlbut has received the invitation for Peru, I have told Mr. Blaine that I thought it best that the invitation should now be given to your government. That the proposed congress has no bearing upon the question of existing hostilities you will see when Mr. Blaine shall have read to you the invitation.

To this Mr. Balmaceda replied:

s c. subject of a conference of American nations, both including and without the ma. States, has been brought to the attention of my government by the United de. olombia some time since, and on other occasions. My government has never l as to what course it would pursue with reference to such matters, and I any answer without first consulting my government. May I ask what of pose of this congress,

piec. Trescot replied that no answer would at this time be ex- in e Government of Chili that I was prepared to leave a ation; that the government might take the question.

See p. 57-58